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Note: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c):
Relation Back of Amendments
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) provides standards
to aid courts in determining whether a new matter asserted
by amendment after the running of the statute of limitations is
barred. Where the asserted new matter "changes" a party, and
if it arose out of the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" as
the pending action and meets certain other conditions, it will be
deemed to have been included in the original complaint under
the doctrine of "relation back of amendments." Treatment of
the new matter as part of the original complaint thus avoids the
bar of the statute of limitations. In this context, the issue is
whether or not the standards of Rule 15(c), and the cases which
have applied it, adequately take into account the policies of the
statute of limitations which are intended primarily to protect
certain rights of defendants.
Prior to 1966, courts reached differing conclusions on the is-
sue of relation back in seemingly indistinguishable fact situa-
tions. This was caused largely by the imprecise standard for de-
cision embodied in the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" lan-
guage of the original rule. The Advisory Committee on the Fed-
eral Rules suggested more definitive requirements based on
standards developed by the better reasoned decisions. Thus,
Rule 15(c) was amended in 1966 in an attempt to establish cri-
teria which would lead to uniformity in the federal courts in the
determination of whether an amendment that changes parties
after the expiration of the statute of limitations would be al-
lowed to relate back. Despite the specificity added by the
amendment, peculiarities in interpretation since 1966 have led to
inconsistencies and uncertainties in the case law. This Note
seeks a correct and consistent application of Rule 15(c) as
amended. Four major areas are considered: (1) the back-
ground and operation of 15(c) prior to 1966, (2) the 1966 amend-
ment, (3) the applicability of 15(c) in diversity cases under the
Erie doctrine and (4) the interreaction between 15(c) and the
policies underlying the statute of limitations.
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II. BACKGROUND AND OPERATION OF RULE 15 (c)
PRIOR TO 1966
A. PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
There is obviously a potential conflict between the statute of
limitations and Rule 15 (c). In each instance that an amendment
asserting new matter is allowed after the limitations period an
arguable violation of both the technical and the policy aspects of
the statute of limitations has occurred.' Thus, a proper analysis
of the ramifications of Rule 15(c) necessarily requires a basic
understanding of the policies on which the statute of limitations
is premised. First, the primary purpose of the statute is to com-
pel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so
that a defendant will have a fair opportunity to prepare an ade-
quate defense.2  Otherwise, the belated institution of an action
might prejudice defendant's preparation of evidence.3 Such
prejudice would commonly result, for example, where critical
evidence is lost or where the facts have been obscured by the
passage of time or faulty memories. The death or removal from
the jurisdiction of witnesses is a further problem.4 Second, the
statute relieves the defendant from the otherwise endless psy-
chological fear of litigation based upon events in the distant
past.5 Third, it frees the judicial system from stale claims which
make resolution of fact issues both difficult and arbitrary.
Fourth, the courts are relieved of the additional caseload which
1. However, Rule 15(c) as amended is specifically designed to
accomodate rather than violate the principles embodied in the statute
of limitations. The extent to which such accommodation is achieved
determines both the success of the 1966 amendment and the correctness
of judicial interpretation of the rule. See Section IV infra.
2. Housing Authority of Union City v. Commonwealth Trust Co.,
25 N.J. 330, 136 A.2d 401 (1957).
3. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MiLLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVL § 1503, at 535 (1971 ed.).
4. Chase Security Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945); Pear-
son v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 912 (1963); Foremost Properties, Inc. v. Gladman, 100 So. 2d
669 (Fla. App. 1958); Roth v. Northern Assur. Co., 32 Ill. 2d 40, 203
N.E.2d 415, 16 A.L.R.3d 442 (1964); Merritt v. Cravens, 168 Ky. 155,
181 S.W. 970 (1916); Anaconda Min. Co. v. Saile, 16 Mont. 8, 39 P. 909(1895); In re Estate of Zehner, 124 Neb. 426, 246 N.W. 863 (1933);
Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 244 App. Div. 606, 280
N.Y.S. 836 (1935); Pine v. State Indus. Comm., 148 Okla. 200, 298 P. 276
(1931); Ford v. Schall, 110 Ore. 21, 221 P. 1052, 222 P. 1094 (1924);
Bowe v. Ledworowsky, 215 Wis. 1, 253 N.W. 791 (1934).
5. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
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would result if old causes of action were permitted, thus promot-
ing efficient judicial administration. Finally, a limitations pe-
riod avoids the disruptive effect of unsettled claims upon com-
mercial intercourse." For example, creditors may more accurate-
ly determine a person's financial status if his former outstanding
debts have been extinguished by the running of the statute of
limitations. s
B. THE CAUSE OF AcTIoN CONCEPT
The problem of relation back of amendments after the expir-
ation of the statute of limitations confronted both federal and
state courts even before the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938. It was stated that whether or not such
amendment related back depended upon the nature of the mat-
ter asserted by the amendment.9 If the amendment stated a
"new cause of action" or one which was different and distinct
from that originally pleaded, the new pleading was treated as
asserting a new action. Accordingly, relation back would be pre-
cluded since the original action would not have tolled the statute
and thus the new action would be barred if the limitations pe-
riod had expired. On the other hand, if the amendment was
found not to recite a new cause of action but merely to restate in
a different form the cause of action originally pleaded, then the
amendment to the plaintiff's complaint related back to the com-
mencement of the action to avoid the statutory bar.'0 The con-
6. F. JAms, CIVm PRocEDuRE § 5.9, 173-77 (1965). Compare
Note, Federal Rule 15(c) and the Doctrine of Substantive Conformity,
59 COLuM. L. REv. 648, 665 (1959).
7. Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv.
L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950).
8. See J. Harlan's concurring opinion in Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 474 (1965). Necessarily the time period in a statute of limita-
tions will be arbitrary, as it is determined by a state legislature and
not by the judicial process. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S.
304, 314 (1945). It could be argued that in a given situation the com-
mencement of a suit a few days after the running of a limitations pe-
riod does not run afoul of any policy of the statute of limitations. Nev-
ertheless, the action will be barred without question by a court. There-
fore, it would appear that legislatures and the courts are not willing to
qualify the absolute cut-off dictated by the time period even though in
a given situation the individual and public interests represented by
the aforementioned policies are not jeopardized. Accordingly the leg-
islature and the courts must feel that there is some further unarticulated
purpose served by the certainty of an absolute cut-off. But it is clear
that this absolute certainty is not supportive of any additional tangible
interest of the defendant beyond those already discussed.
9. See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 6 (1949).
10. White v. Holland Furnace Co., 31 F. Supp. 32 (S.D. Ohio
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ceptual difficulty involved in the determination of whether a new
cause of action was asserted posed substantial problems."
1939); Motsenbocker v. Shawnee Gas & Elec. Co., 49 Okla. 304, 152 P. 82
(1915). The court pointed out that no matter what position it took, a
substantial number of precedents could be found to support either side.
11. The Supreme Court has handled the concept of cause of action
in the statute of limitations context in different ways depending upon
the facts. In an early case, Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wyler, 158 U.S. 285
(1895), the Court adopted a restrictive notion of a cause of action in de-
termining whether the statute of limitations had run. Plaintiff had
originally based his suit on the legal theory of negligence caused by an
incompetent fellow-servant. After the case had been removed to fed-
eral court and the statute of limitations had run, plaintiff amended his
complaint seeking recovery upon a Kansas statute which held rail-
roads liable for the negligence of their employees. Plaintiff's original
pleading had stated facts necessary for recovery under the statute and
thus only the legal theory had been revised. Id. at 295-96. The Court
disallowed the amendment on the ground that there had been a change
in legal theory, and hence a new cause of action. The Supreme
Court later allowed an amended pleading to relate back in Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570 (1913), where plaintiff
originally sued in her individual capacity for her son's death under a
Kansas statute. She sought to amend to sue as administratrix under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act after the statute of limitations had
expired in respect of the latter action. The Court reasoned that the
change was in form rather than in substance, that it introduced no new
or different cause of action, nor set up a different set of facts as the
ground for recovery, and thus related back to the commencement of
the suit. It is not difficult to see that, owing to the uncertainty caused
by these inconsistent cases, the lower courts would adopt divergent tests
to determine whether a new cause of action had been pleaded in the
amendment.
A later Supreme Court case had discredited the Wyler decision as
being too restrictive, holding that the cause of action concept must be
dealt with pragmatically. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co.,
288 U.S. 62, 68 (1933). See also Maty v. Grasselli Chem. Works, 303
U.S. 197 (1938).
The typical tests employed by the courts in practically all jurisdic-
tions were: (1) Whether a recovery upon the original petition would
bar a recovery under the amended complaint, Salyers v. United States,
257 F. 255 (8th Cir. 1919); McDonald v. Nebraska, 101 F. 171 (8th Cir.
1900); Whalen v. Gordon, 95 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1899); (2) Whether the
same evidence would support both pleadings, Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Evans, 100 F.2d 549 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 306 U.S. 665 (1938); Bixler
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 201 F. 553 (M.D. Pa. 1913); (3) Whether the
measure of damages would be the same in each case, Salyers v.
United States, 257 F. 255 (8th Cir. 1919); (4) Whether the allegations
of each pleading would be subject to the same defenses, Hogle v. Re-
liance Mfg. Co., 113 Ind. App. 488, 48 N.E.2d 75 (1943); Cytron v. St.
Louis Transit Co., 205 Mo. 692, 104 S.W. 109 (1907).
The test of whether the real parties and interests and the essential
elements of the controversy would remain the same was also used.
James v. Dr. P. Phillips Co., 115 Fla. 472, 155 So. 661 (1934). Another
test occasionally employed made the general wrong suffered and the
general conduct causing the wrong determinative factors. VanDoren
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 93 F. 260 (3rd Cir. 1899); Jacobs v. Pennsylvania
[Vol. 57:83
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C. THE RELATIONSHIP OF RULE 15 (c) wirH 15 (a)
A full understanding of the relation back doctrine of Rule
15(c) requires an examination of the entire rule because an
amendment will relate back only if it is permissible under other
subdivisions of the rule. The objective of Rule 15 generally is to
facilitate the use of amendments to the pleadings to insure the
proper presentation of a case and to promote the disposition of
litigation on the merits.' 2 Rule 15 (c) thus encourages the use of
amendments to clarify the original complaint or to correct an
error made in the original complaint without being barred by the
statute of limitations. Although the thrust of Rule 15 as a whole
is to allow the liberal use of amendments to implement the im-
portant federal policy of encouraging litigation on the merits,
Rule 15(c) imposes necessary restrictions in deference to the
equally important premises of the statute of limitations.
Rule 15(a) deals broadly with the standards for allowing
amendments prior to trial, whether or not the amendment pre-
cedes the tolling of the statute of limitations. The section of
Rule 15 (a) applicable to 15 (c) is: "otherwise a party may amend
his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires."'13 The test of "justice" employed by the courts is wheth-
er the proposed amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing
party.14 Consequently, courts look to the adverse effects of such
an amendment on the party opposing it, and then only those
caused by the moving party's failure to assert the new matter
in the original pleading.' 5 Generally, where the opposing party
would not be prejudiced, where the movant has not been guilty
of bad faith and where the trial itself would not be unduly de-
layed, courts will allow an amendment in order to assure a de-
R.R., 31 F. Supp. 595 (D. DeL 1934). Other courts would not allow an
amendment where the statute of limitations had run if there would be
actual prejudice to the other party. Wright v. Eureka Tempered Cop-
per Co., 206 Pa. 274, 55 A. 978 (1903).
12. Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 48 (1957):
The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game
of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the
outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading
is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.
Cf., United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310 (1960); Maty v. Grasselli
Chem. Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938). See generally 3 J. Moonn, FmmAL
PRACTicE q 15.02[1l] (2d ed. 1968).
13. FED. R. Cm. P. 15 (a).
14. 3 J. MoosE, FEDERAL PRACTicc 15.08[21, at 874-75 (2d ed.
1968); Note, supra note 6, at 651.
15. 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 115.08[2] (2d ed. 1968).
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cision on the merits. 16 Rule 15(a) applies to all amendments be-
fore trial, and thus its standards will be at least indirectly con-
sidered by courts in determining whether a 15(c) amendment
should relate back to the date of the original filing."
D. OPERATION OF RULE 15 (c) BEFORE THE 1966 AMENDMENT
The adoption of Rule 15(c) in 1938 changed the test from
16. Chamberlin v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 194 F. Supp.
647 (E.D. Pa. 1961); United States ex rel. Ross v. Sommers Constr. Co.,
184 F. Supp. 563 (D. Del. 1960); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American
Plumbing & Supply Co., 19 F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1956).
17. Generally a 15 (c) issue arises only in connection with the dis-
cretionary provision of Rule 15 (a). Note, supra note 6, at 654. But a
few courts have found a connection with Rule 15 (b). Conry v. Balti-
more & O.R.R., 95 F. Supp. 846, 849 (W.D. Pa. 1951). The court in dic-
tum applied the issue of relation back to the amendments-to-overcome-
objections-to-evidence provision of subdivision (b). The following
courts raised the 15(c) issue in connection with amendments tendered
under the amendment-to-conform-to-the-evidence provision of subdivi-
sion (b): Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 165 F.2d 920 (3rd Cir.
1948); Wall v. Brim, 145 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 857 (1945); Anderson v. Brady, 6 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Ky. 1947).
While Rule 15(a) applies only to amendments before trial, Rule
15(b) applies to amendments during trial. Issues not raised by the
pleadings can be tried by express or implied consent of the parties and
will be treated as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Rule 15(b)
allows the amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence and
the raising of these issues at any time. Should a party object to evi-
dence on the ground that it is not within the issues contained in the
pleadings, the court may allow amendments when the merits of the ac-
tion will be reached and the opposing party fails to indicate how the
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action upon the merits. The test of Rule 15(b) is the same as that of
15(a) except that the emphasis is on the prejudice to the opposing
party and is not as concerned with diligence. Southern Coast Corp. v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 181 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1950); Robbins v. Jordan, 181
F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Krout, 157 F.2d 912
(2d Cir. 1946). The relationship of 15 (b) to 15(c) is relatively unim-
portant since Rule 15(a) encompasses the same tests as 15(b). FED.
R. Civ. P. 15 (b) provides:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all re-
spects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amend-
ment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so
freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him
in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court
may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence.
[Vol. 57:83
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that of the new cause of action standard to whether or not the
new matter asserted by amendment arose out of the "conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth
in the original pleading.'" Under this latter standard, courts
were basically expected to examine the "aggregate of operative
facts"'19 rather than the conceptual cause of action standard 0 or
the legal theories of recovery.21 Rule 15(c) gave courts broad
discretion in deciding whether a particular amendment should
relate back.22 For example, where the statute of limitations had
expired, the policies of the statute could be considered by courts
in determining whether the amendments related back.2 3 Despite
this seemingly large scale change in the law, some courts merely
considered Rule 15 (c) a concise restatement of the law already in
existence.24 Thus, some courts continued to look to the cause of
action concept rather than the factual situation or the operative
facts.25
After 1938, an amendment which sought to change the capa-
city or identity of the parties caused many courts to scrutinize
the facts to determine whether the defendant knew or was suf-
ficiently apprised of the pendency of the action as to constitute
notice.26 Relation back was generally allowed since the defend-
18. Committee Note of 1937. Reprinted at 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 15.01[2] (2d ed. 1968); See also Pike, Objections to Pleadings
Under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 YALE L.J. 50, 68-69(1937). Rule 15 (c) provides:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
19. C. CLARK, CODE PLEADnG § 19 at 137-40 (1928).
20. Bowles v. Pure Oil Co., 9 FED. RULEs SEmv. 15c.1, Case 2 (E.D.
Pa. 1946) ("The doctrine of relation back of amendments existed long
before the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, but Rule 15c
broadened its application." Id. at 345); Pike, supra note 18, at 68-69.
21. Commentary, 2 FED. RULES SEarv. 15c.1 at 653 (J. Pike & .
Fischer eds. 1940).
22. Bowles v. Pure Oil Co., 9 FED. RuNES SERv. 15c.1, Case 2 (ED.
Pa. 1946).
23. Comment, 7 U. CH. L. REv. 733 (1940).
24. Anderson v. Abbott, 61 F. Supp. 888 (W.D. Ky. 1945).
25. L.E. Whitham Constr. Co. v. Remer, 105 F.2d 371 (10th Cir.
1939); See also Commentary, supra note 21.
26. Goodrich v. England, 262 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1958) (initial
bankruptcy proceeding alleged defendant was a partnership whereas
defendant was at all times a sole proprietor); Owen v. Paramount
Prods., Inc., 41 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Cal. 1941); Echevarria v. Texas Co.,
31 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1940). Change in capacity cases usually arise
where plaintiff originally sued in an individual capacity and the ap-
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ant rarely could be found to be without adequate notice.2 7  In
these cases, it was emphasized that no change in the parties be-
fore the court would result from the amendment and that all
parties had notice within the limitations period of the facts out
of which the claim arose. Although relation back was allowed
in most of the change of capacity cases, the pre-Rule new cause
of action concept still frequently influenced courts in considering
these amendments.28
A situation similar to the change of capacity cases was en-
countered when plaintiff sued a particular entity but later dis-
covered after the expiration of the statute of limitations that he
had misnamed it. These cases also allowed relation back under
15(c) because it was a correction of a mere "misnomer."2 9 The
test was said to be whether it was clear that the person before
the court was the person plaintiff intended to sue.30 Again,
there was usually little problem with notice.
plicable wrongful death statute required a suit by the personal repre-
sentative. Another frequent change in capacity situation is that in
which a guardian is the proper party instead of the individual or vice
versa.
27. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brown, 338 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1964);
Taormina Corp. v. Escobedo, 254 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 827 (1958); Goodrich v. England, 262 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1958);
Fleming v. John Deere Plow Co. of Syracuse, 158 F. Supp. 399 (W.D.
Pa. 1958).
28. Russell v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 303 F.2d 674 (8th Cir.
1962); Frankel v. Styer, 209 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Fierstein v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 79 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Pa. 1948); Echevarria v.
Texas Co., 31 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1940).
29. Grooms v. Greyhound Corp., 287 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1961);
Shapiro v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 274 F.2d 743 (3rd Cir. 1960);
Grandey v. Pacific Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1954); County The-
atre Co. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 166 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa.
1958); Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1950).
These cases all involved the misnaming of a corporate defendant
through the assertion of the wrong state of incorporation or the mis-
statement of some minor part of the name. But see Lomax v. United
States, 155 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Harris v. Stone, 115 F. Supp.
531 (D.D.C. 1953). The latter case reached an unfortunate decision
since the original complaint named Mr. and Mrs. Augustus Stone as
defendants and the amended complaint made the correction to J. Austin
Stone and Margaret Stone, at the same address as that in the original
complaint.
30. The court in Grandey v. Pacific Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 27, 29 (5th
Cir. 1954) applied an objective test obtained from Professor Moore's
treatise:
The test should be whether, on the basis of an objective stand-
ard, it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff had in mind a
particular entity or person, merely made a mistake as to the
name, and actually served the entity or person intended; or
[Vol. 57: 83
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However, courts generally refused to apply Rule 15(c) to an
amendment which substituted or added a new party, whether
plaintiff3' or defendant, 32 to those included in the original com-
plaint. The rationale was that bringing in new parties consti-
tuted a new "claim" which, if allowed to relate back, would deny
a party the statute of limitations defense.3 3 However, several
exceptions, generally based on equitable considerations and the
proposed defendant's timely knowledge, were developed. First,
the "identity-of-interest" doctrine stated that where the parties
are closely related in their business activities the institution of
an action against one is notice of the litigation to the other.
Thus, when the new and old parties had sufficient identity-of-
interest, relation back was found to be non-prejudicial.3 4 Courts
whether plaintiff actually meant to serve and sue a different
person.
31. Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 117 F.2d 95 (2d
Cir. 1941); Athas v. Day, 161 F. Supp. 916 (D. Colo. 1958); Aarhus
Oliefabrik, A/S v. A.O. Smith Corp., 22 F.R.D. 33 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
32. Butler v. Sinn, 423 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1970); Graves v. General
Ins. Corp., 412 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1969); Bufalino v. Michigan Bell
Tel. Co., 404 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969);
United States ex Tel. Statham Instruments, Inc. v. Western Cas. & Sur.
Co., 359 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1966); Lewis v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1966); Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399 (W.D.
La. 1970); People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F. Supp.
635 (E.D. La. 1968); Phillip v. Sam Finley, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 292 (W.D.
Va. 1967); Nave v. Ryan, 266 F. Supp. 405 (D. Conn. 1967); Burns v.
Turner Constr. Co., 265 F. Supp. 768 (D. Mass. 1967); Storey v. Garrett
Corp., 43 F.R.D. 301 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Moul v. Pace, 261 F. Supp. 616(D. Md. 1966); Cone v. Shunka, 40 F.R.D. 12 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Martz
v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1965); Graeff v. Borough
of Rockledge, 35 F.R.D. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Wynn v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp.
875 (D.D.C. 1963), affd sub nom. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Wynn,
343 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Fematt v. Nediloyd Line, 191 F. Supp. 907
(S.D. Cal. 1961); Strauss v. Rex, 191 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Pa. 1960);
Robbins v. Esso Shipping Co., 190 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Wagner
v. New York, Ontario & Western Ry., 146 F. Supp. 926 (M.D. Pa. 1956);
Kerner v. Rackmill, 111 F. Supp. 150 (M.D. Pa. 1953); Messelt v. Se-
curity Storage Co., 14 F.RD. 507 (D. Del. 1953); Godfrey v. Eastern
Gas & Fuel Associates, 71 F. Supp. 175 (D. Mass. 1947).
33. United States ex rel. Statham Instruments v. Western Cas. &
Sur. Co., 359 F.2d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 1966). If a new defendant was
brought into an action after the running of the statute of limitations, the
original complaint was a new cause of action as to him and thus he
could use the statute of limitations as a defense. The new plaintiff
situation was similar except that the defendant had not prepared his
investigation or evidence against the new plaintiffs claim.
34. Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 325 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Fitzgerald, 272 F.2d 121, 129
(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960); American Fidelity &
Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 851 (1951); United States ex rel. Way Panama,
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maintained that the statute of limitations should not be so me-
chanically applied as to defeat the adjudication of a just claim
where the correct parties were already on notice of the proceed-
ings from an early stage or were even unofficially involved in
the proceedings.3 5 Second, an estoppel-type approach was de-
veloped. Estoppel was applied where defendant had misled
plaintiff into believing that he had sued the correct party in or-
der to delay suit against the correct defendant before the expira-
tion of the limitations period. In this situation, courts did not al-
low the newly sued defendant to raise the statute of limitations
as a defense.3 6 However, since it was the originally named de-
fendant that had engaged in the misleading acts, the newly
named defendant arguably could not be estopped from asserting
the defense. Courts usually resolved this conceptual problem by
finding a close connection between the defendants so that the
misleading conduct could be imputed to the correct defendant.3 7
Third, some courts allowed relation back on the theory that
S.A. v. Uhlhorn Int'l, S.A., 238 F. Supp. 887 (D.C.Z. 1965); Dalweld Co.,
Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 9 FED. RULES SERV. 15a.32, Case 3(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Lackowitz v. Lummus Co., 189 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Pa.
1960) (court allowed amendment to relate back where originally
named defendant corporation was a wholly owned subsidiary which
was dissolved and its assets transferred to a division of the parent cor-
poration); Mattson v. Cuyuna Ore Co., 24 F.R.D. 363 (D. Minn. 1959);
Republic of Turkey v. Central Chem. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 132 (D. Md.
1959); Janis v. Kansas Elec. Power Co., 99 F. Supp. 88 (D. Kan. 1951).
The last case is typical of many of the cases under the identity-of-in-
terest exception in which an amendment is asserted which seeks to
join insurers as parties plaintiff after the statute of limitations has run.
The Janis court held that relation back would be allowed because the
insurers were the real parties in interest and thus a new cause of action
was not presented. The court's reference to real parties in interest
would indicate that many of these insurance suits will now be covered
by Rule 17 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
35. The court in De Franco v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 156, 160
(S.D. Cal. 1955), stated that:
The primary function of the complaint is to notify the person
against whom relief is sought of the claim or cause of action
asserted; thus where the 'defendant has had notice from the
beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a
claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the
statute of limitations do not exist' ... and an amendment
should be allowed. (citation omitted)
36. Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1950);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Interstate Equip. Corp., 74 F. Supp.
791 (D.N.J. 1947).
37. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CivmL § 1500, at 522-23 (1971 ed.). The estoppel-type approach is thus
limited in application to those situations in which there is a close rela-
tionship or identity of interest between defendant and the proposed
defendant.
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plaintiff attorney's error in suing the wrong party was excusa-
ble. 8
The Advisory Committee in its Notes of 1966 stated that some
courts had applied incorrect criteria "leading sporadically to
doubtful results."39 For example, in Robbins v. Esso Shipping
Co.,40 plaintiff attempted to add a defendant which was inter-
locked with the defendant corporation already before the court
in an action under the Jones Act for the death of a seaman. The
court rejected plaintiff's motion to amend on the basis that Esso
Standard Oil Company, the defendant attempted to be added,
never took affirmative action to lull plaintiff into a false sense of
security. Although the court thus dealt with the estoppel-type
approach,41 it entirely overlooked the identity of interest be-
tween the two defendants. However, it is possible that plaintiff
in Robbins only attempted to argue an estoppel theory on the
basis that both defendants had the same attorneys. Neverthe-
less, where defendants are interlocked corporations it would
seem that the court should have at least mentioned the identity-
of-interest exception. Despite cases like Robbins, discrepancies
usually arose not because courts completely ignored any usable
legal doctrine but because the doctrines were often improperly
applied to the facts.42 For example, one court refused to apply
the identity-of-interest test where a parent corporation was origi-
nally sued and its wholly owned subsidiary was substituted by
amendment.43 Instead, the court's test was simply whether the
subsidiary had been before the court prior to the expiration of
the limitations period.
38. McDonald v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 27 F.R.D. 442 (W.D. Pa.
1961) (court allowed amendment to correct previous complaint where
at time of answer by wrong defendant the plaintiff's attorney was in
the hospital for a few weeks and was unaware of the original defend-
ant's denial; however, the correct defendant had received notice of the
accident in question before the expiration of the statute of limitations).
Courts will weigh the absence of prejudice to the opposing party before
employing this exception.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (c), Advisory Committee's Note; 39 F.R&D. 82,
83 (1966).
40. 190 F. Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
41. See text accompanying notes 36, 37 supra.
42. Many examples can be cited but a few cases stand out which
reveal courts' application of law to facts. E.g., Jacobs v. McCloskey &
Co., 40 F.R.D. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (no identity of interest between par-
ent and wholly owned subsidiary); Kerner v. Rackmill, 111 F. Supp.
150 (M.D. Pa. 1953) (proposed amendment did not relate back because
defendant was a new party as a corporation rather than an individual
doing business as originally sued, despite the fact that the individual
was the corporation's agent for the receipt of service).
43. Jacobs v. McCloskey & Co., 40 F.R.D. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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One of the reasons for the discrepancies in decisions prior
to 1966 suggested by Professor Moore is that, although Rule
15(c) does not incorporate 15(a) directly, relation-back amend-
ments must usually be considered under Rule 15(a), which
grants the court discretion in refusing to allow an amended
pleading.44 Professor Moore thus suggests that Rule 15 (a) has
caused courts to be unpredictable. 45 Nevertheless, it would ap-
pear that the chief reason for inconsistency before 1966 was that
15(c) itself established no criteria except the "same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence" test which gave courts a great deal of
discretion in analyzing relation-back problems.
III. THE 1966 AMENDMENT TO RULE 15 (c)
A. INTRODUCTION
The second sentence of Rule 15(c) was added by the 1966
amendment, leaving the first sentence of 15(c) unchanged. Rule
15 (c) as amended provides:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth
or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amend-
ment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An
amendment changing the party against whom a claim is as-
serted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and,
within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has
received such notice of the institution of the action that he will
not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and
(2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concern-
ing the identity of the proper party, the action would have been
brought against him. [Italicized language indicates 1966 amend-
ment.] 46
44. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
45. 3 J. MOoRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 18, 15.15[4-1], at
1048.
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c). See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R. Fed.
269 (1972). References to the 1966 amendment will hereinafter concern
only the emphasized portion of Rule 15(c) quoted in the text; the
amendment further provided that:
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States At-
torney, or his designee, or the Attorney General of the United
States, or an agency or officer who would have been a proper
defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and
(2) hereof with respect to the United States or any agency or
officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant.
The Notes of the Advisory Committee indicate that the primary
reason for the amendment of Rule 15(c) was to rectify the unjust re-
sults that were occurring when the incorrect governmental agency or
department head was being sued and the amendment did not take place
within the unusually short statutory time period. However, Rules 15(c)
(1) and 15(c) (2) apply more broadly to include actions against non-
[Vol. 57:83
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The stated purpose of Rule 15(c) is to clarify "when an
amendment of a pleading changing the party against whom a
claim is asserted (including an amendment to correct a misnomer
or misdescription of a defendant) shall 'relate back' to the date of
the original pleading."47 It has been questioned whether the
amendment was intended to impose more restrictive require-
ments or whether Rule 15(c) is now to be regarded as more
liberal than the old rule. However, it is likely that the Advisory
Committee never thought in terms of strict or liberal allowance
of amendments, but was more concerned with developing precise
criteria to establish a sensible test for relation back. 48
In any case, the requirements set out in the second sentence
of the amended rule are both a clarification of prior law and a
compromise with the policies of the statute of limitations. The
Advisory Committee amplified Rule 15 (c) in the hope of at least
rectifying the sporadic results reached by courts due to the appli-
governmental defendants where the wrong one was originally sued and
an amendment is sought to correct the error.
47. FmD. R. Civ. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee's Note; 39 F.R.D.
82 (1966).
48. A literal reading of amended Rule 15 (c) might lead a court to
believe that several requirements have been added to the more general
"conduct, transaction, or occurrence" language of old 15 (c) to make it
more restrictive when party changes are sought. Yet the courts have
granted relation back more freely since the amendment. Several courts
have indicated that amended Rule 15 (c) is to be read liberally. Woods
Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Amer., 438 F.2d 1286,
1299 (5th Cir. 1971); Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 236 (5th
Cir. 1968); Travelers Indem. Co. v. United States ex rel. Constr. Spe-
cialties Co., 382 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1967); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brown,
338 F.2d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 1964); Washington v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co.,
324 F. Supp. 849 (WiD. La. 1971); Wentz v. Alberto-Culver Co., 294 F.
Supp. 1327 (D. Mont. 1969). No court has stated that the amended rule
is to be applied restrictively. This does not mean that parts of amended
Rule 15(c) have not been construed restrictively, but that, as a whole,
Rule 15(c) is to be applied liberally. See, e.g., People of the Living
God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. La. 1968) (court held
that facts constituted the addition of a new party so that the amend-
ment could not relate back because Rule 15(c) only encompasses at-
tempts to correct the name of a party already in the suit; this is a re-
strictive interpretation of "amendment changing the party"). An ex-
ample of a court's reluctance to interpret the amended rule restrictively
is Washington v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. La. 1971).
The court stated that "The 1966 Amendments to Rule 15 (c) were an
attempt to liberalize and clarify its provisions. It certainly was not
considered an attempt to restrict the liberality of amendments or their
relation back." Id. at 856. While the 1966 amendments to 15(c) thus
seem generally to liberalize the requirements, the necessity of deferring
to the fundamental policies of the statute of limitations precludes any
truly radical interpretation of the rule.
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cation of incorrect criteria.49 The Advisory Committee essen-
tially combined the criteria used by some courts prior to 1966
and refined these to accommodate the policies of the statute of
limitations. Despite the Advisory Committee's attempt at clari-
fication, many residual problems of interpretation remain. One
persistent problem that has confronted the courts is whether the
case law under old Rule 15(c) carries over for consideration
along with the new requirements of the amended rule. Another
set of problems has arisen in interpreting the language in Rule
15(c) which survived the 1966 amendment. Interpretations have
differed and thus inconsistent results are still a frequent occur-
rence.
The analysis of the 1966 amendment which follows will con-
sider the requirements of Rule 15(c) in the following order: (1)
whether the language "notice of the institution of the action"
means notice of the filing of the suit or merely informal notice
of the claim; (2) the interpretation of the language "commenc-
ing of the action within the period provided by law," including a
suggested amendment to that language; (3) a discussion of the
changing of the parties requirement, including an analysis of the
scope and meaning of the word "changing"; (4) an examination
of the application and meaning of prejudice within the context of
Rule 15(c); and (5) the interpretation of the requirement that
the proposed defendant knew or should have known the action
would have been brought against him but for a mistake as to the
identity of the proper party.
B. INCONSISTENCIES AND UNCERTAINTIES IN
RULE 15 (C) AS AMENDED
1. "Notice of the Institution of the Action"
Courts appear to be in conflict as to how broadly the phrase
"notice of the institution of the action" should be construed. At
one extreme of the spectrum a very literal reading of notice
might require service of process on the proposed defendant be-
fore the statute of limitations is tolled.50 Near the other ex-
treme is a holding that the proposed defendant is put on notice
of any litigation concerning a given transaction or occurrence;
that is, as long as one party is suing from a particular factual sit-
49. FED. R. Crv. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee's Note; 39 F.R.D.
82-83 (1966).
50. See Bufalino v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 404 F.2d 1023, 1028 (6th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969).
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uation, then the proposed defendant will be on notice of any oth-
er claims arising from the same transaction or occurrence.51
"Incident notice," though even more extreme, is another possible
interpretation of the requirement of "notice of the institution of
the action," since arguably a proposed defendant would be suf-
ficiently aware of any possible lawsuit based upon a potentially
litigable incident.
The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that notice can be
informal for purposes of this section of the amended rule.52 An
example of informal notice is contained in Meredith v. United
Air Lines.53 The plaintiff in Meredith originally sued the United
States, alleging liability for a mid-air collision between a com-
mercial airliner and a military-type aircraft. After the running
of the statute of limitations, plaintiff discovered that the mili-
tary-type aircraft may have been operated by Lockheed on tests
for the Air Force. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint
to add Lockheed. Lockheed previously had been called upon to
defend its pilot's action before a Civil Aeronautics Board inquiry
shortly after the accident, at which time it learned of the event
and the possibility that commercial passengers were injured.
The court held that Lockheed had sufficient notice for purposes
of the amended rule in that it had notice of the possibility of a
claim.
The Meredith interpretation of notice has been rejected by
some courts, apparently even by the court of appeals of the
same circuit.54 In Craig v. United States, 5 a widow sued under
the Death on the High Seas Act for the wrongful death of her
51. See Washington v. Cameron, 411 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Patterson v. White, 51 F.R.D. 175 (D.D.C. 1970). See also Snoqualmie
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 372 F.2d 951, 960 (Ct CL 1967).
The court stated:
Thus notice is the test, and it is built-into the rule's require-
ment that the amended pleading arise out of the same con-
duct, transaction, or occurrence." In other words, the inquiry in
a determination of whether a claim should relate back will focus
on the notice given by the general fact situation set forth in
the original pleading.
In this case the plaintiff was added rather than a defendant.
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee's Note; 39 F.R.D.
82-83 (1966).
53. 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
54. Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969), appears to
reject the Meredith interpretation of notice. See also Washington v.
T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. La. 1971); Wentz v. Al-
berto-Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mont. 1969).
55. 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969), alfg 284 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. Cal.
1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969).
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pilot husband. Plaintiff's action was timely commenced against
the United States, but she subsequently attempted to add Litton
Systems, Inc. after the expiration of the limitations period. Lit
ton had investigated the accident in connection with another
civil action brought by a seaman injured in the same accident.
The lower court held that although Litton had notice of the oc-
currence of the accident, it was not aware of the widow's lawsuit
prior to the expiration of the limitations period. Thus, the court
allowed Litton to use the statute of limitations as a defense to
effectively bar the amendment. The decision was affirmed by
the circuit court of appeals on the ground that notice must be of
a lawsuit and not the incident which gives rise to the lawsuit."
Superficially, it would appear that Craig implicitly disap-
proves Meredith. However, the court never specifically over-
ruled Meredith. One possible distinguishing feature of the two
decisions, as suggested by one commentator,5 7 is the differing
fact situations of the two cases. The court in Craig reasoned that
Litton's investigation of the seaman's injury would not neces-
sarily have made it aware of the widow's potential claim. While
it is certainly probable that Litton was aware of the husband's
death, it conceivably could have assumed that the widow chose
not to sue. By contrast, the CAB investigation in Meredith was
conducted as a result of an injury to a passenger on a commer-
cial airline and Lockheed knew this was the impetus behind the
investigation. Thus, Lockheed prepared for the CAB adminis-
trative hearing aware of a possible civil claim arising from the
injury to the passenger. However, this distinction is perhaps
sor±ewhat superficial in that Lockheed similarly could have con-
sidered that Meredith decided not to institute a lawsuit. Fur-
thermore, there remains a doubt why Litton should not have in-
vestigated the pilot's death while it was investigating the sea-
man's injury. It does not seem unreasonable to expect a corpo-
rate defendant to gather all the possible facts necessary to de-
fend any action arising out of a highly litigable situation such as
that in Craig. A more substantial distinction may be that in
Meredith Lockheed apparently knew within the limitations pe-
riod that plaintiff was bringing a claim against it as a result of
the CAB investigation; Litton, however, may not have known of
56. Nevertheless, it would appear that the court in Craig did not
dismiss the possibility that notice could arise from an incident even
though it looked for notice of a possible lawsuit. See note 119 infra.
57. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 1498, at 510 (1971 ed.).
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the widow's claim within the statutory period. Moreover, the
Meredith court placed importance on the fact that Lockheed did
not file an affidavit stating the point in time it had acquired
knowledge of plaintiff's claim although it was required to do So.1 8
Thus, the court could easily have concluded that Lockheed ac-
tually did have knowledge of the passenger's specific claim with-
in the limitations period.
The distinction between Meredith and Craig might best be
understood by placing the two decisions on a notice continuum.
In Craig, Litton had notice of a highly litigable incident, one out
of which litigation had already arisen. In Meredith, Lockheed
had specific notice of the development of actions on the part of a
plaintiff which led to a claim against Lockheed based on the same
litigable incident. Thus, the Craig decision dealt with the ex-
treme of notice, that is, notice merely from a litigable incident.
To accept such incident notice for purposes of Rule 15(c) would
allow the addition or substitution of any party that was involved
in a highly litigable incident, as, for example, in an accident
where a person was injured or property was damaged and a pos-
sibility of fault on the part of the prospective defendant was evi-
dent. Meredith did not approach this extreme since there was
knowledge of a specific claim arising from an incident in which
Lockheed had been involved.
A literal reading of 15 (c) would require that the notice be
that of the filing of a particular lawsuit. A strict interpretation
of notice would essentially require a plaintiff to make an amend-
ment by the time the statute of limitations period expires, be-
cause the proposed defendant would not have any "notice" of the
filing of the suit until he was served. One exception to this re-
sult would be where the correct defendant was served but the
wrong name was used.59 Another exception would be the identi-
ty-of-interest situation where the correct defendant realizes suit
has been mistakenly filed against its counterpart. °0 The diffi-
cult questions which have arisen under the amended rule occur
in cases like Meredith and Craig where no identity of interest or
misnaming exists. In these situations it is essential that the no-
tice requirement be liberally interpreted in order to allow rela-
tion back more freely than under the old rule.
However, any interpretation which deviates from literal no-
tice must satisfy the policies of the statute of limitations. The
58. Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34, 38 (S.D. CaL 1966).
59. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
60. See text accompanying note 34 supra. See also note 71 infra.
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refusal to allow the statute of limitations defense absent literal
notice is justified in at least one situation: where the proposed
defendant knew, or should have known, sometime during the
limitations period that a specific claim was likely to be filed.
Thus, a proper interpretation would require notice of the asser-
tion of a specific claim or the possibility of such an assertion
against the proposed defendant arising out of the same transac-
tion, occurrence, or factual situation as that of the original com-
plaint.61 Such an interpretation would both promote decisions
on the merits and preserve the important objectives of the stat-
ute of limitations defense.
By contrast, an interpretation of notice as merely knowledge
of an incident would effectively vitiate the statute of limitations
since a party changed by amendment may not have prepared
any evidence or may have felt secure by the passage of time in
such a situation. In effect, the statute of limitations defense
would be abrogated in any factual situation that could give rise
to a legal claim.6 2 Therefore, notice can be interpreted as infor-
mal notice without violating the policies of the statute of limita-
tions if its meaning is limited to knowledge of a specific claim or
possibility of one within the limitations period.
2. The Limitations Period Problem--'the period provided by
law for commencing the action"
The amended rule refers to the "conduct, transaction, or oc-
currence" requirements for relation back where the changing of
61. Language to this effect can be found in Williams v. United
States, 405 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1968). However, the facts indicate that the
capacity of the plaintiff was changed rather than that of the defendants.
Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee Notes state that the attitude in
revised Rule 15(c) applies by analogy to amendments changing plain-
tiffs. 39 F.R.D. at 83-84. In Williams the court held that the gov-
ernment had fair notice of the mother's claim as a parent of an injured
minor, although the mother originally sued only as next friend of the
minor. The court stated that:
Not only must the adversary have had notice about the opera-
tional facts, but it must have had fair notice that a legal claim
existed in and was in effect being asserted by, the party be-
latedly brought in. This becomes of special importance in
situations in which a common set of operational facts gives rise
to distinct claims (or defenses) among distinct claimants (or
defendants) ....
405 F.2d at 238.
62. A proposed defendant actually would only be deprived of his
statute of limitations defense if another party had been sued in connec-
tion with the incident that gave rise to a legal claim, and an amend-
ment sought to add or substitute the proposed defendant.
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parties is attempted. It requires that, "within the period pro-
vided by law for commencing the action against [defendant],"6
the defendant "(1) has received such notice of the institution of
the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his de-
fense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that,
but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party,
the action would have been brought against him."'' 6 Although
the "period provided by law" language has resulted in some con-
fusion among courts, the correct interpretation of this phrase is
that requirements (1) and (2) must be fulfilled within the stat-
ute of limitations period.6 5 However, one court has interpreted
the phrase to mean that the amendment must be filed within
that period.66 This is certainly a misstatement of the rule be-
cause if the amendment had to be filed within the limitations pe-
riod, the relation back issue would never arise.0 7
Several problems have arisen with this language in Rule
15(c). In Martz v. Miller Brothers Co.,08 plaintiff's motion to
amend was denied where he attempted to add the words "of
Newark" to "Miller Brothers Company" which appeared in the
original complaint. Two separate corporations existed, "Miller
Brothers Company" located in Wilmington and "Miller Brothers
Company of Newark," both of which were incorporated in Dela-
ware. It was clear that plaintiff had mistakenly tried to sue the
Wilmington enterprise since one of its agents was served. On
its face, the amendment appears to be the correction of a mere
misnomer which had been generally allowed to relate back under
the old rule despite the statute of limitations.0 The court noted
the difficulty of drawing the line between those amendments
that merely correct mistakes in the names of the parties and
those that are attempts to substitute new parties. But the court
concluded that the plaintiff was attempting to substitute a new
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (c).
64. Id
65. Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399
(W.M. La. 1970); Brennan v. Estate of Smith, 301 F. Supp. 307 (M.D.
Pa. 1969).
66. Monarch Indus. Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 276 F.
Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
67. See 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.15 (42] n. 3 (Supp. 2d ed.
1968).
68. 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1965). See generally 6 C. WRIGHT &
A. ,MIE, supra note 57, § 1498, at 506, n.84. The Martz decision was
analyzed under the proposed amendment to Rule 15 (c) but was decided
under pre-1966 case law.
69. See text accompanying notes 29 and 30 supra.
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party.70 Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiff's second con-
tention that they were misled into naming the wrong defendant
by the joint advertising of the Newark and Wilmington stores.
The court found that the exception of estoppel only applies to de-
fendant's misleading acts which occur after commencement of
the suit and which have been motivated by the suit.
71
70. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that there was excus-
able neglect because of lack of sufficient time for his attorney to as-
certain the correct defendant. The court felt that the question of the
excusability of the attorney's negligence had no bearing where it
could not find counsel negligent. Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F.
Supp. 246, 252 (D. Del. 1965).
71. Id. at 252. Another issue centered on whether there was suffi-
cient identity of interest between the two corporations such that serv-
ice on the agent of "Miller Brothers Company" was in effect service on
"Miller Brothers Company of Newark." Plaintiff argued that the offi-
cer of the Wilmington enterprise who was served was constructive
"agent" of the Newark outfit, and thus service was made on proposed
defendant. Id. at 253. Summons was served on de Polo who was
secretary of the Wilmington store but not an officer or shareholder of
the Newark store. However, the court did not regard the corpora-
tions as so closely linked that service on one was equal to service on the
other despite the fact that both corporations had several common offi-
cers and shareholders. Id. at 255. The court noted that actual notice
was not received by the correct defendant until three days after the
running of the statute of limitations.
The identity-of-interest exception which developed under the pre-
1966 Rule 15(c) is clearly continued by the language of the amended
portion of Rule 15 (c). Identity of interest means that the parties are so
closely related in their business activities that the institution of an ac-
tion against one is notice of the litigation to the other. See text accom-
panying note 34 supra. Stated another way, an identity of interest in-
dicates that a party will have fair notice of the action and an oppor-
tunity to prepare its case, as well as reason to know of plaintiff's mis-
take in suing the wrong business. If the business activities are so
closely related so as to assure such notice, it is almost certain that Rule
15(c) (1) is satisfied. Several courts have applied the identity-of-inter-
est rationale to post-1966 decisions. See generally 6 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 57, at § 1499. Relation back has been allowed
where no prejudice would result to a party sought to be added by the
amendment. As one court has pointed out, the decisions have been
unclear on the issue of what constitutes such an identity of interest be-
tween the new and former parties that permitting the new party to en-
ter would not be prejudicial. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234,
237-38 (5th Cir. 1968).
The relationship needed to satisfy the identity-of-interest test has
been found to exist between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary,
Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1970); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. United States ex rel. Constr. Specialties Co., 382 F.2d 103
(10th Cir. 1967); Wirtz v. Mercantile Stores, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D.
Okla. 1967), or between brother-sister corporations whose officers, di-
rectors or shareholders are substantially the same people and who may
have similar names or even conduct their business from the same of-
fices, Bernstein v. Uris Bldgs. Corp., 50 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Marino v. Gotham Chalkboard Mfg. Corp., 259 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y.
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The most significant issue raised by the Martz case involved
the problem of "commencing the action." Time limits are often
geared in state statutes of limitations to the filing of a complaint 2
However, amended Rule 15(c) requires notice of the institution
of the action within the time limit. This demonstrates a defect
in the amended rule. Usually an action in these states against a
defendant will be timely commenced by filing even though he
does not have notice of the institution of the suit until after the
limitation period has elapsed. However, Rule 15(c) requires
that the proposed defendant receive notice within the limitations
period, even though in any given case the defendant might not
receive notice until after the expiration of the limitations period.
1966). But see Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 255 (D. Del.
1965). In the case where one corporation has been dissolved or merged
with a successor corporation, courts have found a sufficient identity of
interest. Callahan v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 47 F.R.D. 359 (E.D.N.Y.
1969); Infotronics Corp. v. Varian Associates Corp., 45 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.
Tex. 1968). See also Wentz v. Alberto-Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327
(D. Mont. 1969). One court regarded the connection between an insur-
ance company and the insured as being an "identity of interest." Angel
v. Ray, 285 F. Supp. 64, 66 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
The extent to which the identity-of-interest rationale will be ex-
panded is unclear. The phrase "identity-of-interests" referred to by the
Angel court connotes more than having a closely connected business
organization. The implication is that two individuals or organizations
have a relationship of affinity through some sort of contractual ar-
rangement, e.g., an insurance contract or a surety arrangement. How-
ever, another court has rejected the extension to a suretyship. United
States ex rel. Statham Instruments, Inc. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co.,
359 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1966). The Statham court held that an amend-
ment adding a surety as a party defendant would not relate back re-
gardless of the alleged congruity between the principal and its surety.
Judge Phillips, dissenting, thought that the decision clearly would be
incorrect under the criteria of Rule 15(c) as amended in 1966. Id.
at 525. The extension of the rationale will probably be slight since
courts will ordinarily apply the criteria of amended Rule 15(c) in
addition to using the identity-of-interest rationale. Prior to 1966, the
rationale was not part of the language of Rule 15 (c), but the amend-
ment incorporates the standards used by courts which applied the ex-
ception before 1966.
Whether the 1966 amendment rectifies the harsh result found in the
Martz decision is uncertain. The Martz court reasoned that since there
was no proof that the common shareholders had the same proportion of
ownership in each corporation or that the same Millers were involved
in each corporation, the corporate entities did not have the requisite
affinity. This reasoning probably would now be rejected by most
courts if only the identity-of-interest test were applied. Nevertheless,
an added problem in Martz was that the agent of the mistakenly sued
corporation did not receive notice until after the statutory period even
though the action had been timely commenced against that corporation.
72. See generally F. JA1vnss, CxviL PaocEnuRE § 1.16, at 46 n5 (1965);
2 J. MooRS, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 3.03, at 707 n.2 (2d ed. 1970).
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This defect is best illustrated by an example based on the Martz
fact pattern. If the complaint against the named defendant is
filed before the expiration of the limitations period, then the ac-
tion against such defendant is valid. Assuming a common agent
of the named defendant and the subsequently proposed defend-
ant for the purposes of service of the complaint, then if filing is
achieved within the limitations period but service is made only
after the period has run, there would be no notice to the pro-
posed defendant before the limitations period and the amend-
ment would fail under 15 (c) (1).73 However, this issue was nev-
er squarely reached in Martz because the court found no agency
relationship between the two corporate defendants.
Such difficulties with the language "within the period pro-
vided by law for commencing the action against him" indicates
a need either for a revised interpretation or for an amendment.
It is doubtful whether the present language of Rule 15(c) is suf-
ficiently broad or flexible to adequately remedy the defect exem-
plified in the Martz situation.74 "Notice of the institution of the
action" would have to be expanded to mean constructive notice
through the mere filing of an action against an entity that has
an identity of interest with a proposed defendant. Such an in-
terpretation of Rule 15(c) is questionable considering that the
objective is notice, whether literal or informal, and that which is
not prejudicial. The difference of a few days as in Martz argu-
ably would not prejudice a proposed defendant, but an interpre-
tation of constructive notice could be prejudicial in other situa-
tions.75 Even if the notice requirement is read to mean informal
notice, there remains a situation where the standards of 15(c)
are inadequate. This would be the case where defendant re-
73. The court in Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 254
n.21 (D. Del. 1965), anticipated this situation as a possible oversight in
amended Rule 15(c). "Query whether this inconsistency in the pro-
posed Rule 15(c) would not frequently defeat the purposes which the
change was intended to serve."
74. See text following note 68 supra.
75. The court in Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 238 (5th
Cir. 1968), emphasized the objective of fair notice under Rule 15 (c):
In determining whether the adversary has had fair notice,
the usual emphasis of "conduct, transaction or occurrence" is
on the operational facts which give rise to a claim by the par-
ticular party based on any one or all of the theories conjured
up, whether timely or belatedly. But when it comes to a late
effort to introduce a new party, something else is added.
Not only must the adversary have had notice about the opera-
tional facts, but it must have had fair notice that a legal claim
existed in and was in effect being asserted by, the party be-
latedly brought in.
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ceives informal notice from service on the wrong defendant after
the expiration of the limitations period but where the action was
nevertheless timely commenced by filing against that wrong de-
fendant. Thus, notice would be timely for the wrong defendant
but not for the proposed defendant.
The Martz court noted the defect in Rule 15(c) and sug-
gested that the words "and serving him with notice of the action"
could be added to Rule 15 (c) after "within the period provided
by law for commencing the action against him.''Th This sugges-
tion would in effect extend the time within which the new de-
fendant could receive notice to permit plaintiff to amend, wheth-
er service on the wrong defendant occurred just before, or short-
ly after, the statute of limitations had run. Such a change would
correct the defect while avoiding the risk of prejudice.
This suggested amendment does not mean that service of
process is the only way in which a proposed defendant can re-
ceive "notice of the institution of the action" within the limita-
tions period. Rather, the amendment extends by a few days the
"period provided by law for commencing the action against him"
by establishing in effect a grace period from the filing of the
complaint to the date of its service. Conceivably then, a pro-
posed defendant could receive informal notice after the statute of
limitations had run but before the time the wrong defendant
was served with notice of the action and the amendment would
be allowed.77
This proposed amendment to the rule does not vitiate the ne-
cessity of interpreting notice to include informal notice. If notice
of a lawsuit or receipt of service of process were required, a fact
pattern similar to that in Meredith would not be remedied by
the proposed amendment. Lockheed did not have literal notice
of a claim through the filing of the passenger's suit and service
on the government. Thus, an extended time period such as that
provided by the proposed amendment would not have been of
any help to the plaintiff in Meredith if literal notice were re-
quired. Therefore, even with the proposed amendment informal
notice should be allowed where the proposed defendant knew, or
76. Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 254 n.21 (D. Del.
1965).
77. Whether this time extension disregards the policies of the stat-
ute of limitations must be determined in connection with the "preju-
dice" requirement. See Section IV, B, infra. Notwithstanding a pos-
sible policies problem, the proposed amendment would rectify the de-
fect that could occur with facts similar to those of Martz.
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should have known sometime during the extended period that a
specific claim was likely to be filed.
3. "Changing the party"
The phrase "changing the party" can be read in four differ-
ent ways: (1) substitution of a new defendant for the present
defendant, (2) addition of a defendant, (3) changing the stated
capacity of the defendant and (4) changing a misdescription or
misnaming (misnomer) of the defendant.
a. Addition and Substitution: the "Changing Party"
The importance of the "changing party" phrase to a plaintiff
seeking an amendment to add or substitute a new defendant is
that the phrase operates as the threshold requirement of the
amendment. Thus, the amended portion of Rule 15(c) applies
only when the amendment actually changes the party "against
whom a claim is asserted." Most courts have construed the
meaning of changing liberally so as to include those amendments
that add as well as those that substitute parties. 78 As stated in
Meredith v. United Air Lines, 79 the "word 'changing' must be
given a sensible and practical construction. '80 However, some
courts have refused to apply "changing" to amendments that
seek to add new defendants.8 l
One court raised yet another uncertainty with regard to the
meaning of changing. It stated that "In this case, however, the
libelant is attempting to add an additional party, to bring in a
new party, rather than attempting to correct the name of a party
already in the suit." -8 2 Apparently the court interpreted chang-
78. Smith v. Guaranty Serv. Corp., 51 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
Wirtz v. Mercantile Stores, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Okla. 1967);
Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966). See also,
Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1970); Williams
v. United States, 405 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1968); Patterson v. White, 51
F.R.D. 175 (D.D.C. 1970); Dunham v. Innerst, 50 F.R.D. 372 (M.D. Pa.
1970); Gram v. May, 41 F.R.D. 52 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Snoqualmie Tribe
of Indians v. United States, 372 F.2d 951 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
79. 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
80. Id. at 39.
81. Crews v. Blake, 52 F.R.D. 106 (S.D. Ga. 1971); People of the
Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. La. 1968); King
v. Udall, 266 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C. 1967). The same result has been
reached in those cases where a plaintiff is sought to be added by
amendment after the limitations period has expired. Cf. Longbottom
v. Swaby, 397 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968); Utah v. American Pipe & Constr.
Co., 13 FED. RULES SERv. 2d 24a.22, Case 1 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
82. People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F. Supp. 635,
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ing to mean only the correction of a name, i.e., a misnomer.83
Such a construction of the word "changing" would render the
1966 amendment operative only in misnomer cases."' If this in-
terpretation were adopted, the courts in effect would be forced
to rely on pre-1966 doctrines to decide cases involving the addi-
tion or substitution of a new defendant. This construction is
hardly acceptable in light of the Advisory Committee Notes
which indicate that the phrase "changing the party" includes
those cases where a defendant's description is changecL8d Thus,
the 1966 amendment clearly was intended to apply to cases
other than mere misnomer changes.
A better approach to the interpretation of "changing" was
that of the court in Craig v. United States,0 which assumed, but
did not decide, that the naming of a new defendant in addition to
the original defendant constituted "changing" the party within
the scope of Rule 15 (c).S7 This approach is preferable to a more
restrictive interpretation since the courts are not precluded from
analyzing the facts in relation to the other criteria established
by the 1966 amendment.8 8 A restrictive interpretation would es-
641 (E.D. La. 1968). The court relied on Judge Holtzoff's assertion in
King v. Udall, 266 F. Supp. 747, 749 (D.D.C. 1967): "[Rule 15(c) as
amended] is limited to amendments changing the party against whom a
complaint was served. It does not apply to additional parties."
83. See Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399
(W.D. La. 1970). But see, Marino v. Gotham Chalkboard Mfg. Corp.,
259 F. Supp. 953, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (new rule abolishes misnomer
semantics). One commentator expressed dissatisfaction with a restric-
tive interpretation of the "changing the party" language of amended
Rule 15(c). Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HAnv. L.
REv. 356, 410 (1967).
84. The results of the cases in n.82 cannot be considered unjust
considering the facts of each case. In both cases, the defendants sought
to be added did not have notice of the claim and would have been
prejudiced in maintaining their defenses if relation back had been al-
lowed.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee's Note; 39 F.R.D. 82
(1966).
86. 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969).
87. Id. at 857 n.3. The court stated that "[f]or present purposes
we assume, but we do not decide, that the naming of a new defendant
in addition to and not in lieu of another defendant misnamed in the
original complaint, constitutes the 'changing' of the party within the
meaning of Rule 15 (c)."
88. An interesting question in relation to the meaning of "changing
a party" is raised in 6 C. WIcHT & A. hML, FEDERAL PRA ricE & Pno-
CEDURE: C= § 1498, at 512-13. Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D.
34. (S.D. Cal. 1966), raises the problem of asserting claims against a
third-party defendant which arose out of the same subject matter as
plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff or original defendant.
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sentially limit the courts to the standards embodied in the pre-
1966 amendment with a concomitantly greater possibility of such
inconsistent decisions as were seemingly endemic to that earlier
period. Therefore, "changing the party" should be liberally in-
terpreted to allow application of the criteria established by Rule
15(c) as amended.
b. The Misnomer Problem
An issue which has arisen in several decisions is whether the
correction of a mere misnomer constitutes a changing of the par-
ties. This issue is an important one in terms of the vitality of
the amended rule. If the term "misnomer" is broadly construed
and the correction thereof is not regarded as a "change in par-
ties," then it is possible that relation back would be granted in
cases which would otherwise not qualify under the criteria of
the amended rule. On the other hand, if correction of misno-
mers is considered to be a "change in parties," whether or not
misnomer is construed broadly, a few amendments that are mere
corrections in name will be disallowed because the requirements
of 15(c) as amended will not have been fulfilled. The Advisory
Committee Notes indicate that misnomer amendments are to be
included within the meaning of the phrase, but they failed to de-
fine the meaning of "changing."8 9 The misnomer problem is fur-
ther compounded by fact patterns similar to that of Martz 0 In
that case, the words "of Newark" were attempted to be added by
amendment to the name "Miller Brothers." The court clearly
found two separate corporate entities although on its face the
correction appears to be one of the corporate name only. The
court had to make a difficult determination as to plaintiff's in-
tent since it was not clear whether plaintiff intended to sue the
proper defendant but was misled into attaching the wrong name,
Rule 14(a) permits plaintiff to assert any claim against the third-party
defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject matter of plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. Most
courts have sustained the third-party defendant's statute of limitations
defense on the premise that plaintiff's claim is a new cause of action.
The better approach as suggested by the Meredith decision would be to
judge the asserted amendment to plaintiff's complaint in terms of the
Rule 15(c) notice requirements. This approach is possible if the third-
party defendant is considered a party brought in by amendment, thus
constituting a "changing of a party" which would trigger the applica-
tion of Rule 15 (c).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (c), Advisory Committee's Note; 39 F.R.D.
82 (1966).
90. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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or whether he intended the wrong defendant and thus named
him properly according to his intent at that time. This is poten-
tially a problem in every misnomer case.
Several cases illustrate the multi-faceted nature of the mis-
nomer problem. In Wynne v. United States ex rel. Mid-States
Waterproofing Co.,9 1 plaintiff's original complaint described de-
fendant as a corporation. After the expiration of the statute of
limitations period, plaintiff sought leave to amend the complaint
to properly describe defendant as a sole proprietorship. The
court allowed the amendment to relate back since all the condi-
tions of the rule as amended had been satisfied. Although the
amendment was only one which sought to correct a misnomer,
the court considered the amendment to be one which changed
the parties, thus triggering the requirements of the amended
rule. In Fricks v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 9 2 plaintiff orig-
inally sued the "Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co." and
sought to correct this after the running of the limitations period
with the name "Western & Atlantic Railroad." By a Georgia stat-
ute the named defendant had adopted the name "Western & At-
lantic Railroad" as an assumed name when it leased tracks from
the state of Georgia. Defendant contended that the statute re-
quired that the railroad be sued in this name for any negligence
on the leased tracks. In direct contrast to Wynne, the district
court held that the correction was one of a misnomer rather
than a change in parties. Obviously the court considered the
fairness of the result in allowing the amendment to relate back.
However, the court did not apply the criteria of the amended
rule because there was thought to be no change of parties.
The results in the Wynne and Fricks decisions were consis-
tent as a matter of policy but the difference in application of the
meaning of "changing" could lead to diverse results in the future.
This possibility is illustrated in Washington v. T.G. & Y. Stores
Co.93 Plaintiff in that case moved to amend the complaint to
correct the original defendant's name. Defendants contended
that the amendment could not relate back because notice of the
institution of the suit was not given within the statutory time
period as required by the new portion of the rule. The court
concluded that only a misnomer and not a change of parties was
involved and that the case should thus be analyzed in terms of
91. 382 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1967).
92. 46 F.R.D. 31 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
93. 324 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. La. 1971).
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the first sentence of Rule 15(c) . 4 The basis for the decision
was that the amendment to Rule 15 (c) was intended to make the
rule more liberal rather than restrictive and thus the court re-
strictively interpreted the meaning of "changing the party"
while liberally applying the amended rule in general 5 To reach
a desirable result, the court disregarded the committee's prescrip-
tion that "changing parties" includes misdescriptions 90
Similarly, in Wentz v. Alberto-Culver Co.9 7 the court was
faced with the dilemma of either applying the criteria of the
amended Rule 15(c) and thereby disallowing the amendment,
or construing the amended complaint as a mere misnomer with
no change in the parties, making the amended portion of the rule
inapplicable. The originally named defendant was an Illinois
corporation which, unknown to plaintiff, had been dissolved a
few years before the suit. However, a Delaware corporation
with the same name had acquired the assets and continued the
business. Clearly the plaintiff intended to sue the Illinois cor-
poration since the complaint charged the Illinois corporation and
the proper defendant, a Delaware corporation, answered in the
name of the Illinois corporation. 8 The Delaware corporation
had been advised that plaintiff was claiming damages arising out
of the use of hair spray in 1964, but did not know of the institu-
tion of the action until February 15, 1966.19 The court decided
that January 31, 1966, the date upon which the complaint had
been filed in state court, was the cut-off date for the statute of
limitations. Thus, the problem was that the Delaware corpora-
94. Id. at 856.
95. Much the same result occurred in Wentz v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mont. 1969), which is commented on in 6 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1499,
at 522 (1971 ed.):
Of course, the Wentz court was faced with a dilemma and the
actual result it reached was desirable. But since Rule 15(c)
is based on a notice policy, the court probably should have re-
lied upon the inherent flexibility of the rule.
96. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
97. 294 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mont. 1969).
98. Id. at 1328.
99. The situation presented to the Wentz court was somewhat sim-
ilar to that in Martz to the extent that the complaint was filed against
the wrong defendant the day before the expiration of the limitations
period, and the corporation did not have notice of the filing of the ac-
tion until after the expiration of the period. The Wentz facts also dem-
onstrate the necessity of an interpretation of notice as informal notice,
since the action was not timely filed against the Delaware corporation,
although it was timely against the dissolved corporation; yet the cor-
poration knew since 1964 of the customer's claim concerning the hair
spray.
F.R.C.P. 15(C)
tion did not have notice of the institution of the action until
after the limitations period. The court clearly realized that if it
applied the new portion of Rule 15(c), the amended complaint
would fail to relate back because the requirements of 15(c) (1)
had not been satisfied. Although the facts would indicate that
an entirely different legal entity was substituted for the defunct
corporation, the court regarded the amendment as the correction
of a mere misnomer and thus not a change in parties. The court
then concluded that only the first sentence of Rule 15(c), which
constituted the rule before 1966, applied in order to allow the
amendment.
Thus, the Wentz court allowed the relation back consistent
with the many decisions prior to 1966 under the first sentence
which allowed them as a correction in form rather than sub-
stance.100 Unfortunately, as in the Washington'0 ' case, the court
disregarded the language of the Advisory Committee Notes
which included the cases of correcting a misnomer or misdescrip-
tion within the scope of "changing the parties."'10 2  The Wentz
court, however, went even further than the Washington court to
reach what it considered to be a desirable result. More impor-
tant than the court's interpretation of "changing" is the conse-
quence of interpreting the meaning of misnomer broadly. 0 3 By
construing an amendment that adds a defendant or substitutes a
different defendant for the one originally sued as a misnomer, re-
lation back is granted in complete defiance of the new require-
100. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
101. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
102. Fm. R. Crv. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee's Note; 39 F.R.D. 83
(1966): "Rule 15(c) is amplified to state more clearly when an amend-
ment of a pleading changing the party against whom a claim is asserted(including an amendment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a
defendant) shall 'relate back' to the date of the original pleading."
103. See Washington v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 324 F. Supp. 849
(W.D. La. 1971), discussed in text following note 93. The Washington
case can be regarded as a true misnomer correction since the first com-
plaint used the name of "T.G. & Y. Family Center" while the amend-
ment was "T.G. & Y. Stores Co." Furthermore, in this case two
separate legal entities were not sued in that the original named de-
fendant was merely a trade name which was corrected by the amend-
ment to its correct corporation name. Nevertheless, the Washington
court rejected the argument that a correction of a misnomer is a change
in parties. The reason given was the same as in Wentz, where actual
notice by service was not effected until after the limitations period and
the court wished to avoid an unjust result. See also Jackson v. Duke,
259 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1958) (plaintiff allowed to correct a misnomer al-
though notice of the institution of the suit was not given within the
statutory time period).
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ments of Rule 15(c). The approach developed by the Wentz
court thus points to a possible defect in the rule if courts can
look to the first sentence of the rule to avoid meeting the require-
ments added by the 1966 amendment. The amended portion of
Rule 15(c) is flexible enough to deal with the problem raised in
Wentz. As suggested by one commentator, the Wentz court
could have proceeded in a different fashion by finding that the
second sentence of 15(c) applied and then finding "notice" by
reason of facts in the case which showed defendant's peculiarly
acute knowledge of plaintiff's claim arising out of the use of the
hair spray in 1964.104 In this way, the flexibility of the rule is
employed by finding notice of the institution of the action by in-
formal notice of a specific claim.
There would still be some question under such an approach
as to the status of a genuine misnomer case: one specifically in-
volving the correction of the name of a defendant already before
the court. Relation back was denied in very few pre-1966 cases
where a simple misnomer was sought to be corrected.10 Under
the amended rule, if misnomers are treated as a "change in the
parties," certain problems would remain if the criteria were ap-
plied literally, e.g., if notice of the institution of the action
would mean notice of the filing of the suit. Generally, this prob-
lem will not arise because in most cases involving misnomers,
even under a restrictive interpretation, the requirements of the
amended rule will have been satisfied. 10 0 There should be even
fewer situations in which the requirements of Rule 15 (c) cannot
be met where a misnomer is sought to be corrected and a liberal
104. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 95, § 1499 at 522. The
facts of the Wentz decision indicate that the new defendant had sent an
experienced investigator to discuss plaintiff's claim and had proposed a
settlement even before commencement of the original suit. The cor-
respondence addressed to the defunct corporation also reached the
Delaware corporation, which, through its agents, responded in the name
Alberto-Culver Co. Furthermore, there was clearly an identity of in-
terest between the defunct Illinois corporation and the Delaware cor-
poration so that commencement of the action against one and eventual
service on the other could have been considered the proper "notice
of the institution of the action."
105. See, e.g., Lomax v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa.
1957); Harris v. Stone, 115 F. Supp. 531 (D.D.C. 1953).
106. Brittian v. Belk Gallant Co., 301 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Ga. 1969)(fact that the word "suburban" was omitted from defendant's name
would not require striking of amendment to complaint, since com-
plaint was served upon the proper party, which had notice of, and had
been involved in the suit from its very beginning). See also Wynne
v. United States ex rel. Mid-States Waterproofing Co., 382 F.2d 699 (10th
Cir. 1967).
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interpretation of notice is employed. In these cases, the defend-
ant whose name was corrected would almost always have had
notice of the institution of the action and knowledge of the mis-
take.
The other alternative in the misnomer area would be to in-
terpret misnomer as outside the scope of "change in the parties."
Under this alternative, the first sentence of the rule would be ap-
plied without consideration of the criteria added by the 1966
amendment. However, this approach may overlook the fact that
the case law developed under the first sentence of the rule did
not automatically allow relation back where amendments cor-
recting the name of a defendant were sought. 1'0 7 If only the first
sentence were used, there would be a greater risk of inconsistent
results due to the lack of definite standards that precipitated the
1966 amendment. 0 8 Furthermore, this approach disregards the
language of the Advisory Committee Notes that misnomers are
to be included within the scope of changing the parties.
Discussion of the flexibility of the second sentence of Rule
15 (c) necessarily brings in the Martz problem and the suggested
amendment discussed previously. The Martz fact pattern'0 9 pre-
sents a situation analogous to that in Wentz"10 in that the court
would be forced to deny relation back if it literally applied the
1966 amendment. However, Martz presents a situation where
even a broad interpretation of 15 (c) which includes misnomers
within the scope of changing the parties would not allow relation
back because of the previously noted defect in the 1966 amend-
ment. The adoption of the proposed amendment to correct this
defect in conjunction with the previously suggested interpreta-
tion of notice"' would avoid the necessity for courts faced with
the Martz or Wentz fact pattern to determine whether the case
involved a misnomer or substitution, assuming that misnomers
are definitely subject to the requirements of the 1966 amend-
ment.
At least two suggestions concerning interpretation may be
made in connection with the misnomer problem. First, in order
to follow the intentions of the Advisory Committee and to pro-
mote consistency, misnomers should be subject to the require-
ments of the amended portion of Rule 15 (c) in order to force ap-
107. Id.
108. See text accompanying notes 39 to 45 supra.
109. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
110. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
111. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
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propriate consideration of the policies of the statute of limita-
tions. Second, the amended portion of the rule should be applied
flexibly through a liberal interpretation of notice. The prob-
lem that remains is to determine how flexibly the rule can be
construed without unjustly depriving a defendant of his statute
of limitations defense.
4. The "Prejudice" Requirement
Not only must the proposed defendant have "notice of the
institution of the action" within the limitations period but he also
must not be "prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the mer-
its." This wording has not been the subject of such close ana-
lytical scrutiny as the "changing parties" and "notice" require-
ments. The Advisory Committee Notes do not deal with the
meaning of prejudice.1 1 2 What constitutes prejudice often de-
pends on the factual situation before the court.1" 3 However,
some courts have been reluctant to precisely analyze the applica-
tion and significance of the prejudice requirement and generally
have made legal conclusions that newly added parties will be
prejudiced without consideration of the particular factual situa-
tion. 1 4
For example, in Phillip v. Sam Finley, Inc.,1 5 plaintiff orig-
inally sued several construction companies and unidentified par-
ties ("John Does") for injuries arising out of an automobile acci-
dent allegedly caused by inadequate barricades and signs on a
highway. After the expiration of the limitations period, plaintiff
sought to substitute several employees of the Virginia State
Highway Department for the "John Does" in the original com-
plaint. 1 6 The Phillip court determined that to allow the amend-
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee's Note; 39 F.R.D.
82-83 (1966).
113. Compare Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal.
1966) with Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969), aff'g
284 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. Cal. 1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969).
114. See, e.g., Metropolitan Paving Co. v. International Union of Op.
Eng., 439 F.2d 300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); Info-
tronics Corp. v. Varian Associates Corp., 45 F.R.D. 91 (S.D. Tex. 1968);
Wirtz v. Mercantile Stores, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Okla. 1967).
115. 270 F. Supp. 292 (W.D. Va. 1967).
116. The substitution of new defendants for fictional persons has
been stated by most courts not to relate back because it is analogous to
adding completely new parties. Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854
(9th Cir. 1969), aff'g 284 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. Cal. 1967), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 987 (1969); Bufalino v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 404 F.2d 1023
(6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969); Hoffman v. Halden,
268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.1959).
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ment would in effect prejudice the employees by precluding the
assertion of the statute of limitations defense. Such an assertion
is misleading. In all cases of relation back of amendments, pro-
posed defendants would be "deprived" of the statute of limita-
tions defense in the sense that they will be unable to assert it if
the conditions of Rule 15 (c) are met. "Prejudice in maintaining
his defense on the merits" must clearly mean something more
than that the defendant simply will be deprived of his statute of
limitations defense. Consistent with the policy objectives of the
statute of limitations, the phrase properly should be construed
to mean that the proposed defendant will be deprived of the fair
opportunity to obtain evidence before it becomes stale. It seems
likely that prejudice is connected with the ability to obtain evi-
dence, since a defendant's surprise or psychological insecurity as
a result of a suit has little bearing on the preparation of a de-
fense on the merits. Moreover, the requirement of notice within
the statutory period encompasses the limitations policies relating
to surprise and psychological insecurity and thus insures that a
defendant will not be forced to seek out witnesses long after
memories have faded and evidence has disappeared.' 17 Actually,
the Phillip case was probably correctly decided on its facts.
However, the court should have explicitly recognized that on the
facts the employees would not have been able to prepare any
evidence within the limitation period absent notice that they
were to be defendants in a lawsuit.
The approach of most courts to the prejudice requirement
has been to state rather bare conclusions without factual analy-
sis.'18 Perhaps the reason is that the prejudice requirement is
not regarded as an independent criterion but one that merely re-
iterates the other requirements. Thus, courts have analyzed the
facts, determined that one of the other requirements has not
been met and, without further factual analysis, found that the
newly proposed defendant would be prejudiced on the merits.
Another possible reason for the absence of guidelines on the
prejudice issue is that many decisions allowing an added defend-
ant have been based on the identity-of-interest exception. If
the proposed defendant has the close relationship with the
named defendant required by this exception, then presumably
117. An illustration of the preservation of evidence situation is
Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966), where the
court doubted that defendant could be prejudiced after he had conducted
a full-fledged investigation of the facts.
118. See note 114 supra.
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no prejudice would result. However, this may not be true in all
cases, and courts should avoid reaching conclusions without con-
sidering possible prejudice. A rare and desirable exception is
the Craig'" court, which wisely perceived the requirements of
Rule 15(c) as discrete elements. It determined that the pro-
posed defendant would be prejudiced because his investigative
research before the expiration of the limitations period did not
focus on plaintiff's claim, thus precluding a fair defense on the
merits.120 The treatment of the prejudice requirement in this
manner tempers any possible broad construction of the notice
requirement: if notice were construed to include informal no-
tice, the prejudice requirement would still have to be satisfied.
Furthermore, the fact that the prejudice requirement acts as a
119. See text accompanying note 55 supra. The Craig court
stated:
Moreover, even if the rule means notice of the incident rather
than notice of the institution of the action, there was failure to
fulfill the further requirement of the second condition that the
notice be such that the new defendant "will not be prejudiced in
maintaining his defense on the merits."
While Litton had, prior to the running of the statute, investi-
gated the factual issues relevant to seaman Sevis' suit, it was
not shown to have investigated additional factual issues relating
primarily to the suit now before us.
413 F.2d at 858.
Opposite results are reached not only when the notice test is used
but when the other part of the first requirement, the prejudice standard,
is applied. In Meredith the court determined that Lockheed would not
be prejudiced in its defense on the merits, since it presumably had
collected the proper evidence during its own investgation. However, in
Craig the court realized that Litton would be prejudiced in its defense
on the merits since it had not investigated the facts of the particular
suit. Such a recommendation for the construction of the prejudice re-
quirements of Rule 15 (c) has been advanced in 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1498, at 510-11 (1971 ed.):
[T]he court should not give special treatment to the careless or
myopic defendant whose alleged prejudice results from his
own superficial investigatory practices or his poor preparation of
a defense. But at least when the facts relevant to one possible
claimant do require a substantially different and more bur-
densome investigatory effort or when the initial action is not
sufficiently serious to warrant a full-fledged investigation, a
party should be able to rely on the statute of limitations when
that claimant does not interpose his claim in time.
It should be noted that the Craig court would never have consid-
ered the defendant's possible prejudice in maintaining its defense on
the merits if it had been satisfied that notice of the institution of the
action was unequivocally lacking. Thus it would appear that the court
in Craig did not dismiss the possibility that notice could arise from
an incident even though it looked for notice of a possible lawsuit.
120. In the identity-of-interest situation it should not be necessary
that the proposed defendant actually conduct a factual investigation
since there is no element of surprise as there may be in the case of an
unrelated added defendant.
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backstop to notice allows a court to broadly interpret notice
without fear that the policies of the statute of limitations will be
violated.
Whether a jurisdiction uses strict or liberal notice will de-
termine how often the prejudice issue is reached. If literal no-
tice is required, the courts would seldom reach the prejudice
requirement. This is so because where the proposed defendant
was not served within the limitations period, the court would
either conclude that there was prejudice or ignore the require-
ment altogether since the notice prerequisite was not fulfilled.
The alternative situation is where the proposed defendant does
have notice by service within the limitation period. In this situ-
ation, there would be no cases where a proposed defendant could
be prejudiced in his defense on the merits. Where defendant
had notice within the limitations period, prejudice would not re-
sult since the opportunity existed to prepare evidence at that
point. Prejudice should have to be carefully considered by a
court only when the amendment seeks to add or substitute a
defendant and the statute of limitations period has already
lapsed for some time. This situation would seldom arise in a ju-
risdiction requiring literal notice but would arise where only in-
formal notice is required.'12 ' Therefore, the prejudice require-
ment will only be a truly essential part of Rule 15(c) if notice
is interpreted to be informal notice.
5. 15(c) (2)-the "Knowledge" Requirement
The 1966 amendment also requires that the party to be
brought in "knew or should have known that, but for the mis-
take concerning the identity of the proper party, the action
would have been brought against him." As with prejudice,
courts have not carefully scrutinized this requirement. In cer-
tain situations it is similar to the estoppel test which prevailed
before the amendment.'122  For example, a newly named de-
fendant could hardly deny the fact that he knew he was the one
intended to be sued where plaintiff served him with process but
121. See text preceding note 59 supra.
122. See text following note 35 supra. The old estoppel exception
has been used by several courts since the 1966 amendment Travelers
Indem Co. v. United States ex rel. Constr. Specialties Co., 382 F.2d 103
(10th Cir. 1967); Trotter v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 13 FED. RULES
SERv. 2d 15c.21, case 5 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Marino v. Gotham Chalkboard
Mfg. Corp., 259 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See generally 6 C.
WRiGH & A. M:LLER, FEDERAL PRAcTicE AND PnocEouRE: CrvnL § 1500
(1971 ed.).
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merely misdescribed him.1 23 Similarly, where plaintiff names
the wrong party but serves the person attempted to be sued,
the defendant normally will be considered to have notice of
plaintiff's mistake and the amendment will accordingly relate
back.1 2 4  In those situations where the proposed defendant did
not receive notice through service of process, and it cannot be
clearly shown that he knew the action would have been brought
against him, the facts must be more closely scrutinized to de-
termine whether the new party "should have known."
One decision has indicated that the 15(c) (2) requirement
will not be so broadly construed as to demand that defendant
have an unreasonable degree of foresight. In Storey v. Garrett
Corp.,125 plaintiff originally did not sue decedent's employer be-
cause it was thought that the employer was immune from suit
under the Defense Base Act. After the limitations period had
expired, a Supreme Court decision cast doubt on that statutory
immunity and plaintiff attempted to amend its original com-
plaint. The court denied the amendment, holding that the pro-
posed defendant could not reasonably have known of the mis-
take any more than plaintiff, or even the courts, could have
known of it. The court noted that Rule 15 (c) (2) required more
than a mistake in identity alone. The party to be brought in
must have known, or have been reasonably expected to have
known, of the mistake.
The facts of the Storey decision indicate a mistake of law
as opposed to a mistake of fact. The Storey court never decided
whether 15(c) (2) encompassed a mistake of fact as well as a
mistake of law since it found that the defendant did not know,
and could not have been expected to know, of the mistake. At
first reading, the language of 15(c) (2)-"mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party"-would appear to merely connote a
123. In the following cases the proposed defendant had knowledge
of a misnomer and the amendment was allowed to relate back.
Wynne v. U.S. ex Tel. Mid-States Waterproofing Co., 382 F.2d 699 (10th
Cir. 1967); Brittian v. Belk Gallant Co., 301 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Ga.
1969); McDonald v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 27 F.R.D. 442 (W.D. Pa.
1961); Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1950);
Godrey v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 71 F. Supp. 175 (D. Mass.
1947).
124. Notice of mistake was found to exist in the following cases:
Infotronics Corp. v. Varian Associates Corp., 45 F.R.D. 91 (S.D. Tex.
1968); Wirtz v. Mercantile Stores, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Okla.
1967); Marino v. Gotham Chalkboard Mfg. Corp., 259 F. Supp. 953
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
125. 43 F.R.D. 301 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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mistake of fact, such as in Martz where the wrong defendant was
named. 126 However, to read Rule 15(c) (2) as excluding other
kinds of mistakes would imply that the amended portion of the
rule is inapplicable to situations where there has been a mistake
as to defendant's legal identity. In light of the broad purpose
behind the 1966 amendment and the intent of the Advisory Com-
mittee, such a reading is tenuous. On the other hand, where a
mistake of law is not one of identity, as in Storey, the matter is
more doubtful. But it would seem unreasonable to distinguish
between the Storey-type mistake and a mistake of identity,
whether factual or legal. If the proposed defendant has received
notice, knows of a mistake and will not be prejudiced, the amend-
ment should be allowed to relate back.
The language of the should-have-known provision in Rule
15(c) (2) does not appear to require that the proposed defendant
know of the mistake as well as that he was the party intended to
be sued. 127  Nevertheless, courts have so construed it. 12 8  One
possible reason for this interpretation is that requiring knowl-
edge that "the action would have been brought against him"
without necessarily knowing of any mistake, is similar to a
broad construction of "notice of the institution of the action"
under part (c) (1) of the rule. If knowledge of the mistake is
not also imputed, the "should have known" clause could be in-
terpreted so broadly that Rule 15(c) (2) would be meaningless
through its exclusion only of situations already excluded by
15(c) (1). For example, if the literal reading were strictly ad-
hered to and the "should have known" clause were broadly con-
126. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
127. See Callahan v. American Sugar Re. Co., 47 F.RD. 359 (E.D.
N.Y. 1969). The court emphasized that the Delaware corporation to
be brought into the case must have realized that it would have been
named as a defendant in the original action if plaintiff had been aware
of the merger. However, the court did not require that the proposed de-
fendant be aware of plaintiff's mistake, although this could be implied.
See also Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1970).
128. Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34, 38 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
The court stated:
Lockheed should have known at an early moment that there
was a strong possibility of a mistake of identity on the part of
Plaintiff and her counsel. It seems obvious that if Plaintiff
had known that the Government had no planes operating in the
vicinity and that Lockheed had a plane or planes so operating
with Government insignia thereon, Plaintiff would have origin-
ally named Lockheed at least as a co-defendant with the Gov-
ernment.
See also Storey v. Garrett Corp., 43 P.R.D. 301 (C.D. Cal. 1967). A de-
cision which could be interpreted either way is Brennan v. Estate of
Smith, 301 F. Supp. 307 (M.D. Pa. 1969).
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strued, the requirement would be satisfied any time a defendant
was involved in an accident or incident threatening possible legal
liability. It would be ridiculous to have two redundant require-
ments. On the other hand, Rule 15(c) (2) should not be equated
with the estoppel test which was applied before the 1966 change.
The estoppel test was previously applied as an exception to the
general rule that amendments adding or substituting defendants
do not relate back. However, it was only applied where defend-
ant had engaged in some sort of misleading activity. To make
15(c) (2) an estoppel test would vitiate the significance of the
words "should have known" since estoppel was only applied
where defendant actually misled the plaintiff.1 2
9
IV. RULE 15 (c) IN DIVERSITY CASES
It is germane to discuss two other issues arising in conjunc-
tion with the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c): (1) whether or
not the Erie doctrine makes 15(c) applicable in diversity cases;
and (2) the extent to which 15(c), if applicable in such cases,
might potentially vitiate the policy objectives on which state
statutes of limitations are premised. Discussion of the Erie
problem 130 will be limited to the effect of Hanna v. Plumer,13 1
129. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
130. For an excellent discussion of Rule 15 (c) in relation to the
Erie problem prior to 1960 see Note, Federal Rule 15(c) and the Doctrine
of Substantive Conformity, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 648 (1959).
131. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Since Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949), the federal courts have applied the state statute of limitations
without question. Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1971);
Cummings v. Greif Bros. Cooperage Co., 202 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1953);
Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. La.
1970); Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966);
Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd., 234 F. Supp. 773 (D.N.J. 1964); Wm. T. Bur-
ton, Inc. v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 214 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. La. 1963). How-
ever, the extent to which the federal courts must apply state practice
is doubtful. Generally, the federal courts have allowed state practice
to dictate when the cause of action commenced and how many years
the statute is allowed to run. Id. The difficult question as to whether
state practice must be followed arises when an issue in which the stat-
ute is less centrally concerned is raised, e.g., the relation back of an
amendment when the limitations period has expired.
After Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), it was important
to decide whether the state statutes of limitations were procedural or
substantive laws. See Comment, 34 N.W.L. Rxv. [ILL. L. REv.] 765
(1940). The first important decision following Erie was Guaranty
Trust Company v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), which announced the prop-
osition that state law must govern in diversity cases on all matters
likely to affect the outcome of the case. Thus it could be argued from
Guaranty Trust that if an amendment would relate back with the pos-
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while discussion of the latter issue will attempt to determine
whether a congruency exists between Rule 15(c) and the statute
of limitations.
A. Erie RESrmED
Courts have been divided on the question of whether Rule
15(c) or the state practice of relation back applies when an
amendment changes the parties.1 3 2 The majority opinion of
Hanna has often been recognized as holding that whenever there
is a direct clash between a federal rule of procedure and a state
rule, the presumption is that the federal rule applies 33 as long
as it neither transgresses constitutional bounds nor exceeds the
delegation of rule-making authority granted in the Rules Ena-
bling Act.1 34 The Court emphasized the twin aims of the Erie
rule, that is, the discouragement of forum shopping and the
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws. 135
Since 1966, most courts faced with the Erie issue in applying
Rule 15(c) have held that Hanna controls and Rule 15(c) ap-
plies despite a conflicting state practice. 3 0 Such courts note
sibility of affecting the outcome of the result, the state practice would
apply. Ragan was the second significant Supreme Court decision deal-
ing with the issue. There a state rule, rather than Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 3, prevailed in determining when an action is com-
menced for purposes of measuring the applicable statute of limitations.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958),
lessened the emphasis on the outcome test. The Supreme Court stressed
instead the need to balance the state and federal interests in the appli-
cation of their respective procedural rules. The Ragan and Guaranty
Trust Company cases were also greatly restricted in application by the
Hanna decision. The Court concluded that neither case really displaced
an applicable federal rule with an inconsistent state practice since the
federal rules involved did not directly cover the points at issue in those
disputes.
132. See generally 3 J. MooRs FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.15[2] (2d ed.
1968); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 122, at § 1503.
133. 380 U.S. at 470. See note 131 supra.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1971).
135. The language of Hanna provided the basis for the primacy of
Rule 15 (c) over conflicting state practice: "To hold that a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode
of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the
Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' at-
tempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act" 380 U.S. at 473-74.
136. Crowder v. Gordons Transp., Inc., 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967);
Holmes v. Pennsylvania New York Cent. Transp. Co., 48 FRD. 449(D. Ind. 1969); Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.R.D. 148 (D. Del
1969); Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Meredith
v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966); Cone v. Shunka, 40
F.R.D. 12 (D. Wis. 1966). Some federal courts have applied state law
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that Hanna gives primacy to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
where there would be no difference in the outcome with state practice.
Shepard v. Chrysler Corp., 430 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1969); Callahan v.
American Sugar Ref. Co., 47 F.R.D. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). The Callahan
court stated:
Although the question of whether or not to permit the com-
plaint to be amended would be considered procedural for Erie
purposes . . . it clearly has substantive overtones. Under such
circumstances, we ought to follow state practice if we can do so
without doing violence to federal policy.
Id. at 361. The quotation indicates a return to the concern with pro-
cedure versus substance begun in Erie. Whether this court relies on
Hanna is not clear but it is possible that weight was given to Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Hanna. Justice Harlan's test in deciding
whether the application of a federal rule is substantive or procedural
is that it is substantive if the purpose of the state law is to regulate a
primary activity of human conduct. In these terms, the doctrine of
relation back probably does not involve primary activity of human
conduct but only a minor adjustment to a statute of limitations.
Where there is no conflict with state practice so that the outcome is
the same, the federal rules clearly should apply. In those states having
a more restrictive doctrine of relation back, it is possible that a plain-
tiff in federal court could amend his complaint to change parties when
it might otherwise be barred in a state court. Although since Hanna,
most courts apply Rule 15(c) rather than the more restrictive state
doctrine, several courts still insist on applying the state practice.
The following decisions apply Federal Rule 15 (c) rather than state prac-
tice: Longbottom v. Swaby, 397 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968); Crowder v.
Gordon Transp., Inc., 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967); Wentz v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mont. 1969); Holmes v. Pennsylvania
New York Cent. Transp. Co., 48 F.R.D. 449 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Scalise v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.R.D. 148 (D. Del. 1969); Fricks v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 46 F.R.D. 31 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Zagurski v. American
Tobacco Co., 44 F.R.D. 440 (D. Conn. 1967); Newman v. Freeman, 262
F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34
(S.D. Cal. 1966); Cone v. Shunka, 40 F.R.D. 12 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Martz
v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1965); but see Anderson v.
Papillion, 445 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1971); Nave v. Ryan, 266 F. Supp. 405
(D. Conn. 1967); Burns v. Turner Constr. Co., 265 F. Supp. 768 (D.
Mass. 1967); West v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 697 (E.D.
Mo. 1966) (decisions which apply state practice). In the latter group of
cases, no rationale for following the state law is developed and the
precedents relied on are pre-Hanna decisions.
In Anderson v. Papillion, plaintiff sought to amend his complaint
after the running of the statute of limitations to add more defendants.
The court used general language to the effect that Ragan was still good
law in the area of those rules which affect the statute of limitations.
The court at one point stated that "[w]e think Ragan, then, controls
this case. Conceding as we do, that it has its critics, it remains viable."
445 F.2d at 842. The language in the lower court opinion is no more
revealing and indicates that the criteria of 15(c) would apply. Ander-
son v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. La. 1970).
Thus the Fifth Circuit appears to directly contradict the lower court's
Erie application.
The Fifth Circuit in another recent decision followed state law
where it did not conflict with Rule 15 (c). Shepard v. Chrysler Corp.,
430 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1970) (however, it is not clear whether the
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dure whenever there is a direct clash with a state rule.13 7 How-
ever, very few of the courts have analyzed Hanna beyond the
general test espoused in that decision. One court concluded that,
since no attack was made on either the constitutional or statu-
tory powers given to the Supreme Court to adopt rules of proce-
dure, the question of relation back was covered by the federal
rule.138
1. Newman v. Freeman and the Twin Aims of Hanna
Although Newman v. Freeman,139 in dealing with a relation-
back problem, failed to critically analyze the holding of Hanna,
it did discuss the twin aims espoused in that opinion. First,
with regard to forum shopping, the court found that Rule 15 (c)
provides no advantage to a plaintiff using the federal courts since
such a plaintiff, prior to commencing the suit, will not have en-
visioned neglecting a claim with the thought of adding it by
amendment after the running of the statute of limitations.'4 0
Second, no privilege is accorded to the out-of-state litigant by
relation back because the case will already be pending in federal
court resolved the Erie question). On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit
in 1968 held that the federal rules apply in cases of relation back, al-
though it was not a case involving a change in parties. Longbottom v.
Swaby, 397 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Louderslager v. Teeple,
16 FED. RULEs SEav. 2d 397 (3d Cir. 1972). After Longbottom, a district
court in the Fifth Circuit applied Rule 15 (c) on the basis that it is a
procedural right and not a substantive right. Fricks v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 46 F.R.D. 31 (N.D. Ga. 1968). However, in this deci-
sion the court also noted that Georgia practice would be the same in
regards to the factual situation before the court.
The Anderson decision also leaves in doubt the issue of whether the
state law actually conflicted with Rule 15 (c) on the given facts. The
reason for this doubt is that the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courfs
refusal to allow relation back based on Rule 15 (c). Where such doubt
exists, absent any compelling reason for following the state practice, the
better reasoned decisions apply Rule 15 (c).
137. Crowder v. Gordons Transp., Inc., 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967);
Holmes v. Pennsylvania New York Cent. Transp. Co., 48 F.R.D. 449(D. Ind. 1969); Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.R.D. 148 (D. Del.
1969); Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Meredith
v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966); Cone v. Shunka,
40 F.R.D. 12 (D. Wis. 1966).
138. Holmes v. Pennsylvania New York Cent. Transp. Co., 48 F.R.D.
449, 451-52 (D. Ind. 1969).
139. 262 F. Supp. 106 (ED. Pa. 1967).
140. See also 6 C. WRiGaT & A. MxLR, PRACTICE & PROcEDURE:
C= § 1503, at 535 (1971 ed): 'Moreover, the need to have a pleading
amendment relate back is rarely perceived before the action is insti-
tuted so that a more liberal federal rule on the subject is unlikely to
affect plaintiffs choice of forum."
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court within the statutory period and the amended complaint
will be closely related to the first complaint if the requirements
of Rule 15 (c) are satisfied. 1 4 1
2. Meredith v. United Airlines and the Rules Enabling Act
Meredith v. United Airlines 42 is one of the few cases to deal
analytically with the real test of Hanna. It discussed the limits
of the delegation of rule making authority expressed in the Rules
Enabling Act. It could be argued that Rule 15(c) exceeds the
scope of the Rules Enabling Act which provides that the rules
shall "not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.' 1 4
Such an argument would assert that the statute of limitations is
a substantive right of the defendant which is modified or
abridged by allowing an amendment to relate back under Rule
15(c). However, the Meredith court rejected this argument:
Lockheed could not argue that sec. 2072 prohibits applying
amended Rule 15 (c) to achieve a relation back of the Amended
Complaint. The Supreme Court has held that no party has any
vested or substantive right in the protection of a statute of
limitations. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,
65 S. Ct. 1137, 89 L. Ed. 1628 (1945). Moreover, as demonstrated
above, under the facts here, Lockheed has no benefit or right
under the California statute of limitations of which it is con-
ceivably being deprived.'44
The court's reliance on Chase Securities Corp. for the proposition
that no party has a substantive right in the protection of a stat-
ute of limitations is somewhat misleading. Although the Su-
141. Hanna's concern with the avoidance of inequitable administra-
tion of the laws was not the equal protection problem between residents
of the same state who happened to choose different courts, but the equal
protection problem between the non-citizen and citizen because of the
former's ability to choose the more advantageous federal court. The
Newman court was correct in determining that no equal protection
problem of any substantial sort would be presented by the out-of-state
litigant's choice of the federal court rather than the state court for the
same reason that no forum shopping problem is created: a plaintiff
would hardly foresee an incorrect complaint in the first place.
As a practical matter, it is doubtful that a court would ever be
faced with a situation where plaintiff would actually choose a federal
court over the state court solely on account of Rule 15(c). If plaintiff
were at all conscious of the problem of unknown or mistaken defend-
ants, he presumably would take the time to check and rectify the com-
plaint rather than make such a choice. On the other hand, it is possible
that plaintiff might choose the federal court in recognition of the poten-
tial necessity of changing parties.
142. 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966). See text accompanying note
53 supra.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1971).
144. Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34, 40 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
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preme Court in Chase Securities Corp. decided that no funda-
mental right of the individual existed in the limitations time pe-
riod itself, since it is subject to legislative grace and control,1 45
it also noted that an individual is entitled to the protections the
statute affords while the time period is in existence. 146
The distinction between procedure and substance in the Rules
Enabling Act context is often difficult to make. 47 The Su-
preme Court has previously held that state practice as to statutes
of limitations is a matter of substance and thus must be applied
rather than a federal rule of procedure.1 48 Whether a state rule
on relation back would be considered one of substance is an
open question. A relation-back rule could be considered one of
substance because of its connection with the statute of limita-
tions.
Even if the proposition can be accepted that a relation-back
rule involves a substantive right,1 49 the substantive aspect of
that right is to have some form of knowledge of litigation which
is sufficient to prepare evidence for a defense at trial. An in-
dividual defendant has no substantive right in the public policies
of the statute of limitations. 50 Rule 15(c) (1) and (2), in con-
ditioning relation back on some kind of notice of the action,
clearly requires that the proposed defendant have sufficient
knowledge of the likelihood of litigation. Therefore, Rule 15(c)
would appear to preserve any substantive right which would or-
dinarily be protected by notice in the typical non-amendment
situation.
3. Ragan and Hanna
Hanna's primary test is that a valid federal rule will be ap-
plied over a directly conflicting state rule. In Hanna, the court
applied the federal rule of service of process which expressly al-
lowed service at abode rather than the state practice which re-
quired service in hand.15' In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
145. 325 U.S. at 314.
146. Id.
147. See 2 J. MooRs, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.04 [4) (2d ed. 1970).
148. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530 (1949); Guaranty Trust Company v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
149. A federal court in the context of Rule 15 (c) has held that the
statute of limitations provides a substantive right. Barthel v. Stammr,
145 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1944).
150. See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra, for the public poli-
cies of the statute of limitations.
151. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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Warehouse Co.,152 the plaintiff tried to establish that Federal
Rule 3 controlled since it could be impliedly read to state that
filing tolls the statute.1 53 However, the Court followed the state
law since the action could not commence until service was made
on the defendant. Service was not within the limitations pe-
riod and the action was barred because not timely commenced.
It has been stated that Ragan was overruled by Hanna."'
However, some authorities have contended that Ragan and Han-
na are distinguishable, and, that since Hanna cited Ragan as au-
thority, 15 5 Ragan survives. If Ragan is in fact still good law, the
distinction could only be that Rule 3 did not directly cover the
point in dispute, i.e., the time the action was tolled. Thus, for
Ragan to be a danger to the application of Rule 15 (c) it must be
shown that an explicit state practice incorporated within the
statute of limitations allows relation back under more demand-
ing standards than those of Rule 15(c) and that Rule 15(c) does
not directly cover the relation back of amendments changing
parties. Even if an explicit state practice can be established, it
would still have to be demonstrated that Rule 15(c) does not
cover the change of defendants or that it does not cover the
statute of limitations problem. It is doubtful that one could con-
vincingly argue that Rule 15(c) does not directly cover a rela-
tion-back problem where the wrong defendant was originally
sued. The Rule as amended in 1966 specifically provides that
"[a]n amendment changing the party against whom a claim is
asserted relates back . ...",15( Furthermore, the obvious impli-
cation of the language of the 1966 amendment is that relation
back can occur as long as notice and knowledge took place within
the limitations period. Therefore, even if Ragan survives Hanna,
it would appear to be less difficult since 1966 to find that Rule
15(c) applies in the face of an explicit state practice. Even if
such a direct conflict cannot be established, it must be recog-
nized that Hanna continues the important balancing of federal
and state interests begun in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc.' 5 7 Strong federal interests exist in encourag-
ing the application of Rule 15(c),' 8 even at the expense of ab-
152. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
153. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 3 states: "A civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court."
154. Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
155. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466, 469, 470 (1965).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (c).
157. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
158. See generally Note, Federal Rule 15(c) and the Doctrine of
Substantive Conformity, 59 COLUM. L. Rsv. 648, 664-67 (1959).
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rogating the state rule of relation back. The use of Rule 15(c)
maintains the uniformity of practice in the federal courts and,
more important, promotes the federal goal of deciding cases on
the merits rather than on technical pleading rules.15 Reliance
on state law would hinder such liberal policies of the federal
rules.
B. RULE 15 (c) AND THE PoLIcIES OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Although the cases which have developed from Erie thus in-
dicate that Rule 15(c) should apply in conflict situations, this
does not mean that the policies of a state's statute of limitations
can or should be disregarded. As the Advisory Committee points
out, the wording of the amended portion of the rule was framed
to carefully defer to the policies underlying such statutes. 00
One issue here is whether the federal courts have been constru-
ing Rule 15(c) so broadly as to transgress certain protections of
the statute of limitations, particularly in cases involving added
defendants. 161 The issue presented by judicial interpretations
159. See Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 250 (D. Del.
1965), quoting C. WRIGHT, FEDmAL COURTS 240-41 (1963).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee's Note; 39 F.R.D.
82-83 (1966).
161. The area of greatest controversy since the 1966 amendment to
Rule 15(c) has been whether an amendment to a complaint adding a
defendant after the statute of limitations relates back. The following
courts did not allow the addition of a new defendant by amended com-
plaint: Butler v. Sinn, 423 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1970); Graves v. General
Ins. Corp., 412 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1969); Bufalino v. Michigan Bell
TeL Co., 404 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969);
United States ex rel. Statham Instruments, Inc. v. Western Cas. & Sur.
Co., 359 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1966); Lewis v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495 (9th
Cir. 1966); Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399(W.D. La. 1970); People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.
Supp. 635 (E.D. La. 1968); Phillip v. Sam Finley, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 292(W.D. Va. 1967); Nave v. Ryan, 266 F. Supp. 405 (D. Conn. 1967);
Burns v. Turner Constr. Co., 265 F. Supp. 768 (D. Mass. 1967); Storey v.
Garrett Corp., 43 F.R.D. 301 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Cone v. Shunka, 40 F.R.D.
12 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del.
1965). The above list is only a superficial coverage of those courts not
allowing the addition of defendants since some of the above decisions
applied the criteria of Rule 15 (c). Those decisions listed above which
state as a general rule that added parties do not relate back by amend-
ment are: United States ex rel. Statham Instruments v. Western Cas.
& Sur. Co.; Lewis v. Lewis; Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co.;
People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co.; and Storey v. Garrett
Corp.
On the other hand, the following courts allowed the addition of
parties by amended complaint after the running of the statute of limi-
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of Rule 15(c) in added defendant cases is whether the addition
of a new defendant by application of amended Rule 15(c) effec-
tively abrogates the primary policy of the statute of limita-
tions1 62 in protecting defendants from stale claims.
Rule 15 (c) (1) is designed to protect the added defendantl 3
in that he must have "notice of the institution of the action
[such] that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense
on the merits . . . ." The interpretations of notice and prejudice
are critical. In line with the Advisory Committee Notes and the
interpretation suggested in this Note,'64 several courts have al-
lowed notice of the institution of the action to be informal.'10
This interpretation of notice could arguably undermine the poli-
cies of the statute of limitations in that it may not be appropri-
ate to expect a defendant to prepare evidence merely because he
has notice of a possible claim against him. This would occur
tations: Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1968) (plain-
tiffs claim added); Patterson v. White, 51 F.R.D. 175 (D.D.C. 1970) (sub-
stitution or addition of defendants would have been allowed if notice
proven); Smith v. Guaranty Serv. Corp., 51 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(added defendant where notice and identity-of-interest existed); Wentz
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mont. 1969) (added de-
fendant on ground of misnomer rather than amended portion of 15(c)
(1) ); Callahan v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 47 F.R.D. 359 (E.D.N.Y.
1969) (added defendant where identity-of-interest and estoppel existed);
Holmes v. Pennsylvania New York Cent. Transp. Co., 48 F.R.D. 449
(N.D. Ind. 1969) (plaintiff added); Infotronics Corp. v. Varian Associ-
ates Corp., 45 F.R.D. 91 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (added defendant where iden-
tity-of-interest existed); Hyatt Chalet Motels, Inc. v. Salem Bldg. &
Constr. Tr. Council, 298 F. Supp. 699 (D. Ore. 1968) (plaintiff added);
Wirtz v. Mercantile Stores, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Okla. 1967)
(added defendant where identity-of-interest existed); Gram v. May,
41 F.R.D. 52 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (addition or substitution of defendant);
Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (added
defendant); Snoqualmie Tribe of Indians v. United States, 372 F.2d 951
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (plaintiff's claim added).
Very few of the above decisions are clearly added-defendant cases
since some are only cited by analogy to the added-plaintiff situation.
Furthermore, many of the added-defendant cases come within the
identity-of-interest exception which existed before the 1966 amendment
to Rule 15 (c). The Sixth Circuit appears to be the only circuit clearly
against the addition of defendants as a general rule. The Ninth Circuit
has conflicting decisions at the district court level as does the district
court in the District of Columbia. No other circuit appears to have a
clear general rule.
162. See text accompanying notes 2 to 4 supra.
163. The courts have been in conflict as to whether the term
"changing" even encompasses the added defendant situation to trigger
the application of the amended portion of Rule 15(c); the suggested
interpretation is that it does. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
164. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
165. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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where a proposed defendant merely has notice of plaintiff's mis-
taken claim against another defendant and is not certain that the
claim will be brought against him. In this situation, a court should
consider the prejudice criterion to decide whether defendant
would be subjected to, or be forced to collect, stale evidence.
No prejudice would result where a proposed defendant has al-
ready conducted a factual investigation similar to an investiga-
tion that he would have conducted if sued. However, the court
must also be careful to determine whether the defendant in the
exercise of reasonable caution should have prepared a factual in-
vestigation because of such notice as he had already received.
If plaintiff originally sued the wrong defendant within the
limitations period but the correct defendant had both 'knowl-
edge" and "notic&' as defined, then the court must determine
whether plaintiff delayed for an inexcusable length of time be-
fore filing an amendment regardless of any prejudice to defend-
ant. Even if the plaintiff did not inexcusably delay, the court
must still consider the prejudice that could occur to a defendant
in his preparation of a defense before granting the amendment.
What constitutes prejudice must be viewed in light of the policy
objectives of the statute of limitations, which include elements of
surprise, factual investigation, availability of witnesses and other
similar considerations. The balancing of notice and prejudice is
best illustrated by the Meredith 6 and Craig'67 decisions. The
Meredith court determined that the proposed defendant had duly
received informal notice of a specific claim which sufficiently as-
sured an adequate defense on the merits because a factual in-
vestigation had already been conducted. The same issue was re-
solved the other way in Craig because the defendant had not
conducted an adequate factual investigation with regard to plain-
tiff's claim.
Although Rule 15 (c) is based in large measure on fair notice
to defendant,'1 68 the Meredith-Craig example illustrates that the
notice requirement alone is insufficient in terms of protection of
the policies of the statute of limitations. The court must deter-
mine whether the proposed defendant "knew or should have
known, that, but for a mistake [in] identity," he would have
been the defendant. Furthermore, if the amendment suggested
in this Note is in operation, this requirement must have occurred
166. See text following 53 supra.
167. See text following 55 supra.
168. See Meredith v. United Air Lines, 41 F.R.D. 34, 41 (S.D. Cal.
1966).
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"within the period provided by law for commencing the action
* . . and serving . . . notice of the action."'10 9 In addition, the
court has discretion in weighing the facts pursuant to Rule 15(a)
to reject the amendment.170 Thus, if plaintiff did not delay
through his own fault but rather through inability to discover
the real facts, the court may be reluctant, either through its dis-
cretion or on the grounds of prejudice, to allow an amendment
adding a defendant if, for example, a year or more has elapsed
since the running of the statute of limitations. 17' Obviously, the
requirements of the second sentence of Rule 15(c), particularly
the prejudice criterion, protect the stale evidence policy of the
statute of limitations by acting as a backdrop to any broad in-
terpretation of the notice requirement.
The second policy of the statute of limitations is more con-
cerned with defendant's psychological security in being free from
the fear of litigation after a certain point in time. 72 The notice
requirement becomes significant since to the extent that a pro-
posed defendant has adequate notice of an existing claim, there
is no good reason for him to feel psychologically secure in not
being sued. Psychological security arguably could result in a
typical non-amendment situation if the time period expires on
an existing claim. However, in the relation-back context, the
proposed defendant also knows that he is the one intended to be
sued, and has not been sued to this point only because of plain-
tiff's mistake. The only possible psychological security which
might be served by a strict limitations application is that, once
the time limit has expired, the plaintiff who has not discovered
his mistake will be barred despite defendant's knowledge. But
this policy of the statute of limitations is not directed to reliance
on plaintiff's errors. Rather, the statute of limitations gives re-
pose to a defendant's reasonable expectation that the slate has
been wiped clean of past obligations. 1 73 In the Rule 15(c) con-
text, a defendant cannot reasonably expect a tabula rasa be-
169. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
170. See Butler v. Poffinberger, 49 F.R.D. 8, 10 (N.D. W. Va.
1970), where the court stated in dictum that Rule 15(c) amendments
are subject to Rule 15 (a).
171. For such an example, see Burns v. Turner Constr. Co., 265
F. Supp. 768 (D. Mass. 1967).
172. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
173. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAV.
L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950). See Section II.A supra. If the defendant
can rely on an arbitrary time period then Rule 15(c) does not protect
this policy. However, it was previously noted that the arbitrary time
periods are subject to change by state legislation.
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cause of an error by plaintiff in suing the wrong defendant The
policy of the statute of limitations here is concerned with fair-
ness to the defendant. It is certainly fair to bring in a defendant
who has had both some sort of "notice" and "knowledge" that
the claim would have been brought against him but for a mis-
take. The fairness to a defendant will be further measured by
the courts in their assessment of prejudice to the defendant
The final policy upon which the statute of limitations is
premised is the promotion of efficient judicial administration by
eliminating unnecessarily stale claims and manufactured facts
from the courtroom. 17 4 Previous discussion1 7 reveals that the
"prejudice" requirement would eliminate stale claims. It should
be noted that Rule 15(c) promotes efficient judicial administra-
tion in another way: elimination of technical pleading rules
with concomitant encouragement of decisions on the merits. Al-
though Rule 15 (c) requires a motion to amend, the primary ob-
jective of Rule 15(c) is to allow plaintiffs to present claims on
the merits without fear of being denied their day in court be-
cause of a technical defect in their complaints. The third policy
of the statute of limitations is not to discourage the trial of cases
on the merits, but, rather, to discourage cluttering courtrooms
with cases that are so stale as to be difficult or impossible to cor-
rectly decide. Therefore, Rule 15 (c) and the statute of limita-
tions in many respects are aimed at the same goals.
An issue previously raised is whether the time extension up
to the point of service of process under the amendment suggested
in this Note1 76 would undermine the statute of limitations. It
arguably does because the incidence of "notice" and "knowledge"
is allowed beyond the statute of limitations period. However,
this argument overlooks the fact that even in a situation where
no relation-back amendment is involved, a proposed defendant
may not have notice or knowledge until he was served with
process, and yet the action would be timely commenced by filing
before the expiration of the limitations period. Thus, if the ac-
tion were filed the day before the period expired, a defendant
in a typical non-amendment situation would not receive service
of process until several days later. However, this analysis may
not hold up in view of the Ragan decision.'7" In a state which re-
quires service of process to commence an action, the defendant
174. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
176. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
177. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
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in a non-amendment situation would have to receive service of
process before the end of the limitations period, unlike the pre-
vious example. The proposed amendment, then, would extend
the period a few days beyond even the typical situation. How-
ever, this argument is based on the assumption that the proposed
amendment extends the time period in all cases. The applicable
portion of Rule 15(c) with the proposed amendment would pro-
vide: "within the period provided by law for commencing the
action against him and serving him with notice of the action."
The latter portion of the quoted language only extends the time
period if the action commences upon the filing of the suit rather
than with service of process. In the Ragan situation, the service
of notice of the action would necessarily take place during the
limitations period provided by law and thus the time period is
not extended in those states where the action commences only
upon service.
The objectives of state statutes of limitations are protected
by the notice requirement of Rule 15(c) '1 as well as by the
"knowledge" and "prejudice" requirements. Thus state interests
are not significantly reduced by application of Rule 15(c), and
the federal rule should prevail in diversity cases. 179 One possible
state interest not protected is a state's view of the use of relation-
back amendments. The state interest in an arbitrary time pe-
riod for commercial intercourse and as a cut-off date for litiga-
tion also may not be protected by Rule 15(c). However, the
state interest in an arbitrary time period is minimal compared
to the federal interest in the use of its procedural rules. Further-
more, operation of Rule 15(c) does not upset credit checks sig-
nificantly1 8 0 nor does it flood the courts with litigation. Since
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee's Note; 39 F.R.D.
82-83 (1966).
179. Until a court adds a completely unrelated defendant or strang-
er by use of Rule 15(c) defendants will not have a viable argument
that they are being deprived of the statute of limitations defense withoutjudicial due process. Not even the Meredith court reached this result;
thus, a defendant would hardly have a constitutional argument as long
as the criteria of Rule 15(c) are applied with a modicum of caution.
Rule 15(c) has been construed both narrowly and broadly by the
courts since 1966, but it appears that no court has yet been in danger of
upsetting the policies of the statute of limitations or depriving a defend-
ant of his statute of limitations defense without procedural due proc-
ess. Given the suggested interpretations and amendments of this Note,
courts should be able to apply Rule 15(c) uniformly without under-
mining the policies of the statute of limitations. Certainly the suggested
interpretations and amendments would not permit the addition or sub-
stitution of a completely unrelated stranger.
180. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
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Rule 15(c) adequately reflects the most substantial aspects of
the key policies of the statute of limitations defense, it is unrea-
sonable to argue that the various important federal interests to
be served by its application should be subservient to a state's
procedural concept.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the 1966 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 15(c) has not been uniformly applied by the courts. One
defect has been noted within the language of the amendment,
and misleading interpretations of its provisions have been dis-
cussed. In order to rectify these inconsistencies and defects, sev-
eral suggestions have been made which seek to satisfy the policy
goals of both the federal rules and the statute of limitations: (1)
notice should be interpreted to mean informal notice by knowl-
edge of a specific claim arising from a litigable incident in which
the defendant was involved; (2) the rule should be amended to
add the words "and serving him with notice" to "within the
period provided by law for commencing the action against him";
(3) "changing party" should include the addition, substitution,
change of capacity and misnomer cases; (4) prejudice should re-
fer primarily to the collection of evidence necessary for an ade-
quate defense; and (5) Rule 15(c) (2) should require knowledge
(whether constructive or actual) of a mistake of identity as well
as knowledge that the action would have been brought against
the proposed defendant except for the mistake. If these sugges-
tions are adopted, Rule 15(c) will be uniformly applied in the
federal courts without undermining the policies of the statute of
limitations.
1972]
